Building the peace: preliminary lessons from El Salvador.

Building the peace: preliminary lessons from El Salvador. When the peace agreement ending 12 years of civil war in ElSalvador El Salvador(ĕl sälväthōr`), officially Republic of El Salvador, republic (2005 est. pop. 6,705,000), 8,260 sq mi (21,393 sq km), Central America. was signed at Chapultepec Castle The Castillo de Chapultepec (translated as "Castle of Chapultepec") is a castle built on top of Chapultepec Hill (Chapultepec comes from N��huatl chapoltepēc and means "at the grasshopper hill"), located in the middle of Chapultepec Park in Mexico City at a height of in Mexico City Mexico CitySpanish Ciudad de MéxicoCity (pop., 2000: city, 8,605,239; 2003 metro. area est., 18,660,000), capital of Mexico. Located at an elevation of 7,350 ft (2,240 m), it is officially coterminous with the Federal District, which occupies 571 sq mi in January1992, it was declared by United Nations Secretary-General The Secretary-General of the United Nations is the head of the Secretariat, one of the principal organs of the United Nations. The Secretary-General acts as the de facto spokesperson and leader of the United Nations. BoutrosBoutros-Ghali Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Arabic: بطرس بطرس غالي Coptic: BOYTPOC BOYTPOC ΓΑΛΗ) (born November 14, 1922) is an Egyptian diplomat who was the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations from to be "a revolution achieved bynegotiations."(2) Both the El Salvadoran government and the leftistopposition Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN FMLN Farabundo Marti National Liberation FrontFMLN National Liberation Party (El Salvador)) proclaimedtheir satisfaction with the peace accords, though for different reasons.The FMLN has emphasized the revolutionary extent of the agreed-uponreforms, while the government has stressed the achievement of peace andthe preservation of constitutional order. Relatively few Salvadorans,mainly from the far Right, have spoken out against the accords. In themonths after the cease-fire, however, the euphoria was replaced bycaution, distrust and anger, as the implementation of the militarydemobilization de��mo��bil��ize?tr.v. de��mo��bil��ized, de��mo��bil��iz��ing, de��mo��bil��iz��es1. To discharge from military service or use.2. To disband (troops). and institutional and economic reforms fell further andfurther behind schedule. The peace accords do provide a blueprint for a more democratic ElSalvador. They include plans to reduce and modify the role of theSalvadoran armed forces, to place them under civilian authority and tocreate a new civilian police force. The accords are not self-executing,however, and the implicit new rules of the game have continued to bedefined through political maneuvering and arduous negotiations overimplementation. These challenges to the peace process raise the questionof whether the accords truly represent a new social pact amongSalvadorans, or a superficial consensus imposed upon them by externalactors. It is clear that the United Nations has defined a new role foritself as a result of the organization's efforts in El Salvador.This was the first time that the United Nations attempted to broker theend of an internal conflict; in the process, the intentional bodydeveloped a number of new approaches to peacemaking PeacemakingSee also Antimilitarism.Agrippa, MeneniusCoriolanus’s witty friend; reasons with rioting mob. [Br. Lit.: Coriolanus]Antenorpercipiently urges peace with Greeks. [Gk. Lit. . The United Nationsgradually expanded its role in the negotiations from that of observer,to active mediator and, ultimately, to verifier of the accords. In 1991,the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission inEl Salvador (ONUSAL ONUSAL Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (UN Observer mission, El Salvador)), whose initial - and unprecedented - role was toverify agreements with respect to human rights. With the beginning ofthe cease-fire on 1 February 1992, ONUSAL became a predominantlypeacekeeping operation Noun 1. peacekeeping operation - the activity of keeping the peace by military forces (especially when international military forces enforce a truce between hostile groups or nations)peacekeeping, peacekeeping mission , designed to verify the separation of militaryforces and supervise the activities of the existing police force. Asdelays and disputes developed over politically sensitive aspects of theaccords, ONUSAL's verification responsibilities expanded further,to mediate the interpretation and implementation of the accords.(3) The most novel aspect of ONUSAL's role, however, has been tofacilitate the consolidation of peace by strengthening domesticstructures that will prevent the recurrence of conflict. ONUSAL is thefirst peacekeeping mission Noun 1. peacekeeping mission - the activity of keeping the peace by military forces (especially when international military forces enforce a truce between hostile groups or nations)peacekeeping, peacekeeping operation to incorporate this new concept, known aspost-conflict peace-building.(4) As defined by the Secretary-General inAn Agenda for Peace, peace-building efforts may include weapons seizureand destruction, restoration of order, refugee repatriation RepatriationThe process of converting a foreign currency into the currency of one's own country.Notes:If you are American, converting British Pounds back to U.S. dollars is an example of repatriation. , training ofsecurity personnel, election monitoring Election monitoring is the observation of an election by one or more independent parties, typically from another country or a non-governmental organization (NGO), primarily to ensure the fairness of the election process. There are national and international election observers. , protection of human rights,reform of governmental institutions and promotion of politicalparticipation.(5) ONUSAL has - or will be - engaged in most of theseaspects of peace-building.(6) In many ways, El Salvador is a best-case scenario for U.N.involvement in post-conflict peace-building. Rarely have previouslywarring parties agreed to such comprehensive reforms designed to addressthe root causes of the conflict. Yet both the civil war and its negotiated conclusion were greatlyconditioned by external influences. While most observers consider theU.N. role in El Salvador a vital one, there remains a nagging suspicionthat its presence actually may in some ways contribute to a longstandingdependence upon international help. The fundamental dilemma remains: Howdo international actors intervene in societies in a way that willstrengthen - rather than weaken or displace - national institutions,thus contributing to a lasting peace? As the following discussion of theEl Salvador case will demonstrate, the key operational challenge for theUnited Nations is to reinforce internal mechanisms for conflictresolution and consensus building, while also providing sufficientlyactive verification to protect the essential structural andinstitutional reforms called for under the accords. The U.N. Role in the Peace Accords U.N. involvement in El Salvador's peace process beganmodestly, with a representative of then Secretary-General Javier Perezde Cuellar serving as an observer to two rounds of dialogue between theright-wing government of El Salvador and the leftist FMLN guerrillasduring 1989. These talks foundered in October 1989, after which the FMLNlaunched its largest offensive campaign of the war. During the course ofthe offensive, the government's armed forces murdered six Jesuitpriests and two witnesses at the Central American Central AmericaA region of southern North America extending from the southern border of Mexico to the northern border of Colombia. It separates the Caribbean Sea from the Pacific Ocean and is linked to South America by the Isthmus of Panama. University in SanSalvador San Salvador, city, El SalvadorSan Salvador(sän sälväthōr`), city (1993 pop. 402,448), central El Salvador, capital and largest city of the country. It is the center of El Salvador's trade and communications. . Violent as they were, these events nevertheless created a situationconducive to peace. By early 1990, all parties to the conflict hadstrong - albeit disparate - incentives to reaching a negotiatedsolution. For one, the FMLN discovered that it lacked the military powerto overthrow the government and that a massive popular insurrection A rising or rebellion of citizens against their government, usually manifested by acts of violence.Under federal law, it is a crime to incite, assist, or engage in such conduct against the United States. INSURRECTION. wasunlikely. Faced with the end of the Cold War, the FMLN revised itsideological focus from that of revolution to the democratictransformation of El Salvador, an end it viewed as achievable throughnegotiation. Second, the Salvadoran military proved unable to defeat theFMLN decisively, increasing pressure among private sector and civilianpolitical elites for a negotiated solution to the conflict.(7) Themilitary also risked a cut-off of U.S. assistance, as a result ofWashington's disdain for the military's involvement in theJesuit murders and subsequent cover-up. The United States United States,officially United States of America, republic (2005 est. pop. 295,734,000), 3,539,227 sq mi (9,166,598 sq km), North America. The United States is the world's third largest country in population and the fourth largest country in area. forced themilitary to the negotiating table, with the understanding that itsinstitutional integrity would not be touched. Finally, the civiliangovernment led by the National Republican Alliance (ARENA), which alsorepresented the most important elements of the private sector, wasmotivated to negotiate as a result of both U.S. pressure and domesticeconomic considerations.(8) Many in the private sector, worried aboutthe short- and long-term consequences of a corrupt and overgrown overgrownsaid of a part that has not been kept trimmed.overgrown hoofovergrown hooves put unusual stresses on bones and tendons and allow for distortion of the wall and sole. military that considered itself above the law, were eager to strip themilitary of its power. In short, one set of actors that was centered around the government- including the ARENA political party, the armed forces and many privatesector elites - came to accept the need for a negotiated settlementmostly out of pragmatic necessity. The FMLN, however, primarily viewedsuch a settlement as its last, best hope for achieving fundamentalsocietal and political reforms. A recognition of the diversity ofinterests and paths taken by the two sides in the negotiations is key tounderstanding the major difficulties that have arisen in the post-accordperiod. Shortly after the November 1989 offensive, Perez de Cuellar and hispersonal representative, Alvaro de Soto de So��to? , Hernando or Fernando 1496?-1542.Spanish explorer who landed in Florida in 1539 with 600 men and set out to search for the fabled riches of the north. , stepped up their consultationswith both sides. This process led to the Geneva Geneva, canton and city, SwitzerlandGeneva(jənē`və), Fr. Genève, canton (1990 pop. 373,019), 109 sq mi (282 sq km), SW Switzerland, surrounding the southwest tip of the Lake of Geneva. Accords of April 1990,in which the parties agreed to bring about a definitive end to the armedconflict, reunify re��u��ni��fy?tr.v. re��u��ni��fied, re��u��ni��fy��ing, re��u��ni��fiesTo cause (a group, party, state, or sect) to become unified again after being divided. the country, promote democratization de��moc��ra��tize?tr.v. de��moc��ra��tized, de��moc��ra��tiz��ing, de��moc��ra��tiz��esTo make democratic.de��moc and guaranteefull respect for human rights. They committed themselves to a process ofsecret negotiations in which the Secretary-General or his representativewould play an intermediary role.(9) A month later, the parties met in Caracas, Venezuela to establishan agenda for the subsequent negotiations. Three stages were envisioned,beginning with political accords sufficient to achieve a cease-fire,followed by negotiations over the reincorporation of FMLN members intocivilian life; and concluding with accords for the consolidation ofpeace. Most importantly Adv. 1. most importantly - above and beyond all other consideration; "above all, you must be independent"above all, most especially , the agenda included language that foresaw arole for the United Nations in the verification of the accords. In the first substantive agreement, reached in San Jose San Jose, city, United StatesSan Jose(sănəzā`, săn hōzā`), city (1990 pop. 782,248), seat of Santa Clara co., W central Calif.; founded 1777, inc. 1850. , Costa Ricain July 1990, the parties agreed to a series of minimum standards forthe protection of human rights, including an immediate end to nightarrests, incommunicado in��com��mu��ni��ca��do?adv. & adj.Without the means or right of communicating with others: a prisoner held incommunicado; incommunicado political detainees. detention and torture. This agreement alsoenvisioned the establishment of a U.N. human rights verification mission- ONUSAL - that would have broad powers and would demand the cooperationof all parties.(10) This agreement thus paved the way for an importantinitiative: Rather than waiting for a cease-fire to put the human rightsmission in place, the United Nations opened an initial ONUSAL office inSan Salvador in January 1991 and began verification operations sixmonths later.(11) In another major step forward, the parties signed anagreement on constitutional reform in April 1991.(12) The next major breakthrough came in September 1991 in New York New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of ,where the parties signed an agreement that essentially altered the logicof the negotiations. The New York Accord rejected the original idea of astatic cease-fire of unknown duration and outcome. Instead, it set out adefinitive, single-phase ceasefire that would involve a progressiveseparation of forces, followed by the gradual but total demobilizationof the FMLN. In a secret annex to the agreement, the FMLN agreed toforego all demands to participate in the existing armed forces,accepting instead a guarantee that its personnel would be allowednon-prejudicial access to participation in a new national civilianpolice force (the PNC PNC Purdue University North Central (Westville, Indiana)PnC Point 'n ClickPNC Police National ComputerPNC People's National Congress (Guyana)PNC People's National Congress ). The New York Accord also established theNational Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), which wouldpossess strong legal powers to verify all aspects of the implementationof the accords.(13) A key point of debate was the issue of inclusion of former FMLNcombatants in the PNC. The United Nations was able to secure anagreement between the two sides by presenting the issue as a matter ofguarantees for the FMLN rather than as a device for power sharing, andby proposing that COPAZ be responsible for overseeing the process ofadmitting FMLN combatants into the PNC. These agreements gave thegovernment and the FMLN a clear picture of the important features of thefinal accords, and thus facilitated the rapid completion of thenegotiations in December 1991 and the signing of the accords in January1992. Together the six sets of agreements address a wide range of issues,including: transfers of land to former combatants and inhabitants :This article is about the video game. For Inhabitants of housing, see Residency Inhabitants is an independently developed commercial puzzle game created by S+F Software. DetailsThe game is based loosely on the concepts from SameGame. of theconflict zones; significant reductions in the size and powers of thearmed forces; the creation of a new civilian police force; reducedimpunity IMPUNITY. Not being punished for a crime or misdemeanor committed. The impunity of crimes is one of the most prolific sources whence they arise. lmpunitas continuum affectum tribuit delinquenti. 4 Co. 45, a; 5 Co. 109, a. for the armed forces; and reform of the electoral and judicialsystems. The government bears responsibility for implementing asignificant number of measures under the accords, while the FMLN wasresponsible primarily for concentrating and demobilizing its forces, anddestroying its weapons. The United Nations helped negotiate a schedulefor synchronized implementation of the reforms on both sides.(14) Peacemaking and Peacekeeping The United Nations' establishment of ONUSAL demonstrates theinternational community's recognition of the need to focus as muchon the implementation of the peace accords as on the negotiationsthemselves. In a number of ways, ONUSAL has helped to provide a climateof relative security and confidence for both the Salvadoran governmentand the FMLN. As a U.N. presence, ONUSAL serves as a channel ofcommunication, provides a disinterested and authoritative interpretationof the accords, proposes solutions when crises develop, requestsconcessions and commitments from both parties and steps in to verifyaspects of the accords that lack sufficient oversight from othermechanisms. These activities go beyond the specific provisions in the accords,but both sides have readily accepted this incremental extension ofONUSAL's mandate as a way to prevent a collapse of the process.ONUSAL's verification role expanded in response to necessity: ByApril 1992, serious delays had arisen in the implementation of keyprovisions of the accords, and both sides' actions threatened thecease-fire.(15) To prevent a total breakdown, both sides turned to theUnited Nations to act as mediator. Initially, U.N. envoy Marrack Goulding secured agreement from boththe government and the FMLN to avoid those activities that mostthreatened the accords. ONUSAL then met with both sides and offered acomplete assessment of government and FMLN compliance with the accords,first privately, and later in a public report released on 26 May 1992.This landmark report made it clear that, while both sides wereresponsible for delays and violations of the accords, the Salvadorangovernment bore responsibility for the most serious problems. Manyobservers believe this report publicly embarrassed the government intotaking its commitment more seriously, leading to a new set of agreementsin mid-June 1992 and increased governmental compliance.(16) The U.N.report on compliance also resulted in an increase of external pressureon the Salvadoran government,(17) and revealed that the United Nationscould exert considerable moral authority over the parties with respectto the implementation of the accords. ONUSAL's presence in El Salvador prior to the cease-fire alsogreatly affected the subsequent peace process. First, it had a positiveimpact on respect for human rights in the country. ONUSAL has the powerto deploy its personnel anywhere in the country and to enter anymilitary facility without prior notice. This potential for surprise - apower possessed neither by the International Committee of the Red Cross "ICRC" redirects here. For other uses, see ICRC (disambiguation).The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a private humanitarian institution based in Geneva, Switzerland. nor by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (established December 14, 1950) protects and supports refugees at the request of a government or the United Nations and assists in their return or resettlement. (UNHCR UNHCRn abbr (= United Nations High Commission for Refugees) → ACNUR mUNHCRn abbr (= United Nations High Commission for Refugees) → HCR m) - hasbeen a key element in what ONUSAL officials describe as the"dissuasive dis��sua��sion?n.The act or an instance of dissuading.[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin dissu " or preventive" impact of the mission.ONUSAL's large scope and presence, according to according toprep.1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians.2. In keeping with: according to instructions.3. one official,"made it difficult for the two sides to intensify the fighting orto walk away from the negotiating table. It was hard to fight in thepresence of ONUSAL."(18) Following the final demobilization of the FMLN on 15 December 1992,the political dynamics of the peace process changed dramatically. Untila new government is installed after elections in March 1994, theresponsibility for continued implementation of the accords will restwith the existing national executive and legislative bodies, both ofwhich were elected prior to the peace accords. The disappearance of theFMLN's military apparatus - a condition of the accords -significantly weakens its position to insist upon government compliance.Only international pressure can ensure further progress; however, thelong-term effects of such pressure remain to be seen. Obstacles to Peace-Building The experience of ONUSAL thus far demonstrates that while the U.N.mission has been quite successful at mediating disputes among theparties and keeping the peace, some aspects of U.N. peace-buildingremain fraught with pitfalls. Important factors contributing to theseproblems include: the specificity - or lack thereof - of agreed-uponreforms; the degree of political will or internal consensus among theparties to implement the reforms; the adequacy or efficiency ofverification mechanisms of the United Nations or domestic bodies; thedegree of reliance on international actors to resolve national disputes;and finally, the institutional capacity of U.N. agencies to delivertechnical and material assistance related to peace-building. It isimperative that the United Nations understand the nature of thesechallenges facing the ONUSAL mission if it hopes to leave behind a moredemocratic society and a sustainable peace in El Salvador. The Specificity of Reforms While several of the immediate crises confronting ONUSAL haverevolved around the ill-defined nature of the accords with respect toland tenure land tenure:see tenure, in law. , perhaps the most damaging long-term deficiency of theaccords relates to inadequate reform of the judicial system. The U.N.mediators did not provide the same kind of leadership in this areaduring the negotiations as they did on issues of police and militaryreform. It was only after several months had passed that ONUSALconcluded that the criminal justice system should be completely overhauled.... Theflaws in the judicial system, demonstrated by its inability toinvestigate violent deaths, the selectivity of the criminal justicesystem and delays in sentencing, cannot be remedied without basicreforms.(19) The constitutional reforms of the judiciary that were approved inthe negotiations did little to remedy these basic problems. While thereforms do call for a more professional and independent selectionprocess for justices, judges and prosecutors, the exact procedures wereleft unspecified, and considerable political debate has ensued over howto structure the institution that will nominate new judges, the NationalCouncil on the judiciary. It remains uncertain how independent thejudicial selection process will be.(20) The reforms leave untouched theextremely hierarchical structure See hierarchical. of the courts that enables the SupremeCourt to control the jurisdiction, legal decisions and administration ofall lower courts. In the past, this concentrated power has been used toblock investigations that might harm the interests of leading politicalparties or the military. The attorney general's office suffers froma similarly vertical structure, which leads to political control overprosecutors' investigations. During the prolonged legislativebattle over how to structure the National Council, ARENA pushed throughlegislation extending the terms of incumbent judges, thus perpetuatingARENA control of the judiciary in a period when critical human rightsand land questions might come before the courts.(21) The ONUSAL Human Rights Division is currently increasing itsefforts to guide reforms to the justice system; however, their successwill depend largely on the cooperation of the existing judiciary.ONUSAL's oversight of judicial and police authorities has beenhandicapped from the beginning by a lack of specificity in the accordsregarding ONUSAL's powers in this area. Judges have been reluctantto cooperate with ONUSAL observers, at times refusing to show ONUSALimportant files on a case. The Supreme Court president has repeatedlyexpressed his opinion that the peace accords do not apply to thejudiciary, since they were signed only by the executive branch ofgovernment and the FMLN.(22) More explicit responsibilities in theaccords with respect to verification of the judiciary might have avoidedthis situation. Political Will A second area of concern relates to the challenges of enforcingpolitical will and encouraging consensus building. One important area inwhich the government has lacked the political determination and unity touphold its obligations under the accords is in the purging of themilitary's officer corps. The accords provided for the creation ofthe Ad Hoc For this purpose. Meaning "to this" in Latin, it refers to dealing with special situations as they occur rather than functions that are repeated on a regular basis. See ad hoc query and ad hoc mode. Commission, composed of three prominent Salvadorans, toreview the human rights and professional records of military officersand recommend administrative measures to remove officers who mightthreaten the new democratic political order.(23) Few observers expectedthe Ad Hoc Commission report to affect the military seriously, as thecommission was allotted only a few months to review over 2,000 files. Infact, the commission called for the removal of virtually all themilitary high command - an unprecedented phenomenon in Latin America Latin America,the Spanish-speaking, Portuguese-speaking, and French-speaking countries (except Canada) of North America, South America, Central America, and the West Indies. andone that has triggered a strong challenge to the accords by the armedforces. As the magnitude of the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendationsbecame known, top military commanders began publicly criticizing thereport as a leftist plot to decapitate de��cap��i��tate?tr.v. de��cap��i��tat��ed, de��cap��i��tat��ing, de��cap��i��tatesTo cut off the head of; behead.[Late Latin d the military.(24) In response topossible divisions within the military and the resulting risk ofinstability, Salvadoran president Alfredo Cristiani has delayedimplementation of some of the Ad Hoc Commission's recommendations,informing Boutros-Ghali that he would keep eight top officers on dutythrough the end of his presidential term and transfer seven others whowere to have been dismissed to military attache ATTACHE. Connected with, attached to. This word is used to signify those persons who are attached to a foreign legation. An attache is a public minister within the meaning of the Act of April 30, 1790, s. 37, 1 Story's L. U. S. posts abroad.(25)Because of initial equivocation by the FMLN on this issue, Boutros-Ghalihas been left alone to pressure Cristiani for full compliance. Less notorious, but potentially more damaging, to the peace processhave been the delays and problems in the creation of the PNC. Despitethe vital importance of the PNC and the National Academy for PublicSecurity (ANSP ANSP Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, PA, USA)ANSP Academia Nacional de Seguros e Previd��nciaANSP Air Navigation Service ProviderANSP Aerospace Nuclear Safety ProgramANSP Adaptive Network Sensor Processor ) among the range of new institutions created under theaccords, ONUSAL has been particularly hampered in its peace-buildingefforts by a lack of government 26 commitment in this area.(26) The PNCwas scheduled to begin its deployment simultaneously with the finaldemobilization of the FMLN, providing an additional guarantee for thesafety of the FMLN and opening a new era of professional policing andimpartial investigation of crimes. Yet the ANSP opened four months late,and in temporary quarters, because the government failed to provide thenecessary funding or facilities. This apparent lack of commitmentdissuaded international donors from contributing to the Academy untilthe government proved willing to increase its role.(27) Another problemrelates to the control of the Academic Council of the ANSP, which isresponsible for admissions to the Academy and oversees curriculum andtraining. This council was designed to be broadly representative, but inpractice has been completely dominated by the director of theAcademy.(28) Without oversight, the director has been able to commitclear and serious violations of the accords, including admitting formerArmy, Treasury Police and National Guard officers. He has also admittedformer military officers who do not fulfill the educational requirementsfor senior command positions.(29) A third important reform stymied by a lack of political will is theestablishment of the Human Rights Ombudsman's office. This officeis designed to investigate cases of possible human rights abuse, assistalleged victims, encourage prosecution of violators and provideeducational programs to promote awareness of, and respect for, humanrights in El Salvador. The Ombudsman's office is intended to takeover many of the functions currently carried out by the Human RightsDivision of ONUSAL. As with the ANSP, however, a lack of governmentfunding impeded the start of operations and the Ombudsman's officecontinues to depend upon international assistance. Furthermore, U.N.Human Rights Independent Expert Pedro Nikken commented in a November1992 report that the investigative activities of the Ombudsman'soffice to date had been "timid."(30) This failure to play astrong monitoring role risks alienating the population, underminingcitizens' confidence in domestic institutions and perpetuating anunsustainable dependence upon ONUSAL's human rights division. Aswith the judiciary, ONUSAL has attempted to take a more active role inworking with and advising the Ombudsman's office, although it istoo early to assess the impact of these efforts. The Need for Effective Verification Also failing to fulfill its intended purpose is COPAZ, the primarynational mechanism created to verify the implementation of the peaceaccords.(31) The agreement to create COPAZ - an institution in which theFMLN could participate - served as an important guarantee to theguerrillas that the implementation of the accords would receive thenecessary national and governmental attention. Under this arrangement,subcommissions were established to monitor and report to COPAZ on theredistribution of lands to ex-combatants and residents of formerconflict zones, the creation of the PNC, preparation of electoralreforms, human rights conditions, freedom of expression andrehabilitative re��ha��bil��i��tate?tr.v. re��ha��bil��i��tat��ed, re��ha��bil��i��tat��ing, re��ha��bil��i��tates1. To restore to good health or useful life, as through therapy and education.2. programs for ex-combatants and civilians wounded in thewar. A major weakness of COPAZ is linked to its inclusion of politicalparties from a wide range of ideological perspectives. COPAZ includestwo representatives each from the government and the FMLN, and one eachfrom the political parties or coalitions represented in the LegislativeAssembly.(32) The representation within COPAZ was intended to encourageconsensus decision making; in practice, however, this arrangement hascreated a stalemate, as three parties generally vote with the governmentand three against. This deadlock has tended to generate emotionallycharged debates, relatively little consensus building and seriousdelays. The subcommissions have reached a similar stalemate in theirdecision making, and have often passed unresolved issues up to the mainCOPAZ body, and from there on to bilateral negotiations between thegovernment and the FMLN.(33) Another factor contributing to the poor functioning of COPAZ isthat the various minority political parties played only a subsidiaryrole in the negotiations of the accords, with the important exceptionbeing the parties' approval of the constitutional reforms agreed toin April 1991. Political parties, therefore, have a somewhat smallerstake in the particulars of the accords than do the Cristianiadministration and the FMLN. Furthermore, the members of COPAZ generallylack the technical expertise to deal effectively with some of the issuesthey must address. The end result is that COPAZ's role has beenonly to provide inputs into the process of implementing the accords,rather than to verify final outputs through actual fieldinvestigations.(34) COPAZ prepares draft legislation, proposescandidates for key posts in new institutions and establishes proceduresfor necessary steps, such as evaluating land tenure. In almost allcases, however, final decisions are either made by the government orworked out in bilateral negotiations between the government and theFMLN, with ONUSAL mediation. Ultimately, COPAZ has proven incapable of enforcing compliance withthe accords when major delays or violations have occurred. One U.N.official pointed out that COPAZ might have functioned better if ONUSALhad been allowed to mediate during COPAZ meetings in the same way it hasin direct bilateral discussions between the government and the FMLN,rather than serving only as an observer to COPAZ.(35) For ONUSALmediation to be effective, however, the government and the FMLN, as wellas the political parties, would have had to give their representativesin COPAZ sufficient authority to make compromises. In addition, COPAZwould require greater and more definitive powers relative to thegovernment. Unfortunately, the shortcomings of COPAZ have meant that most ofthe responsibility for verifying the implementation of the accords hasfallen on ONUSAL. ONUSAL, however, has not always made effective orprompt use of its moral authority and status as an objective interpreterof the accords. For instance, ONUSAL has avoided making publiccriticisms of the government on human rights matters in a timelyfashion, despite its mandate granted by the San Jose Accord.(36) Publiccensure A formal, public reprimand for an infraction or violation.From time to time deliberative bodies are forced to take action against members whose actions or behavior runs counter to the group's acceptable standards for individual behavior. In the U.S. represents the ultimate form of leverage that ONUSAL can exertin human rights issues, since the mission has no real mechanisms forenforcing its recommendations. Failure to publicize pub��li��cize?tr.v. pub��li��cized, pub��li��ciz��ing, pub��li��ciz��esTo give publicity to.publicizeor -ciseVerb[-cizing, -cized] human rightsconcerns squanders this leverage. Forceful public representations couldserve to generate pressure within El Salvador for officialaccountability and, eventually, for structural changes. Because of its extensive presence throughout the country, as wellas its unprecedented powers of investigation and access to governmentfacilities, the human rights division of ONUSAL has a unique capacity tomonitor allegations of human rights abuses within El Salvador. YetONUSAL has not actively sought to distinguish between cases in which itsown investigations have pointed to state involvement, and cases that ithas concluded are examples of common crime. ONUSAL's silence notonly risks contributing to the impunity of state actors, but also failsto clarify Salvadorans' polarized A one-way direction of a signal or the molecules within a material pointing in one direction. perceptions of the current humanrights situation. These gaps in ONUSAL's supervision, together with theaforementioned lack of specificity in the accords with respect to theextent of ONUSAL's powers, have undermined efforts at human rightsverification. There are some recent indications that the police andhuman rights divisions of ONUSAL have begun to take a more proactiveapproach to verification, including pursuing more vigorousinvestigations of their own. It is too soon, however, to assess theimpact of these developments. Reliance on International Actors Through the United Nations, the international community has beencalled upon throughout the peace process to resolve issues that couldnot be settled by consensus, or to verify implementation of measures onwhich a tenuous consensus had been reached. The most visiblemanifestation of this tendency is the ONUSAL mission itself, which wasset up to verify the accords. Such reliance on international actors mayhave far-reaching implications regarding the success of the UnitedNations' peacebuilding efforts in El Salvador and elsewhere. As noted, the immediate effect of ONUSAL's presence was toprevent or dissuade TO DISSUADE, crim. law. To induce a person not to do an act. 2. To dissuade a witness from giving evidence against a person indicted, is an indictable offence at common law. Hawk. B. 1, c. 2 1, s. 1 5. further human rights violations. Yet the ultimategoal of ONUSAL's presence - to strengthen national institutions andnon-governmental organizations (NGOS NGOS Next Generation Operating System ), especially their ability tomonitor and protect human rights - should not be confused with itsshort-term impact. In a society whose citizens harbor a fundamentaldistrust of governmental authorities, it was important that ONUSAL movedin quickly to establish the confidence of the civilian population. As aresult, the victims of violent crime have been much more willing toreport their cases to ONUSAL than to the Salvadoran judicial or policeauthorities. Although ONUSAL does encourage people to raise their casesbefore the proper domestic authorities, citizens seldom do so, believingsuch action to be a waste of time or fearing retribution. Even ifindividuals do turn to the appropriate authorities, the unfortunatelikelihood that they will encounter an unresponsive unresponsiveNeurology adjective Referring to a total lack of response to neurologic stimuli and unreformed Adj. 1. unreformed - unaffected by the Reformationorthodox - adhering to what is commonly accepted; "an orthodox view of the world" judiciary may only increase their distrust of the system. ONUSAL could make a greater contribution in this area by moreactively supervising, advising and, when necessary, publicly criticizingexisting national legal institutions. A recent nationwide surpriseinvestigation by ONUSAL into the lack of due process protections forindividuals accused of misdemeanors pressured the police intoestablishing a joint task force with ONUSAL to improve policeadministrative procedures. This experience may provide a model for moreactive use by ONUSAL of the threat - but not the use - of public censureto gain greater influence over the practices of judicial institutions. The human rights component of ONUSAL also has effectively displaced- albeit unintentionally - the human rights work previously carried outby NGOs and the Catholic Church. ONUSAL has failed to work with theseorganizations to redefine their new roles in the post-war period. Inaddition, ONUSAL has not been sufficiently effective in its role asaccuser, a fact realized in mid-1992 when a former ONUSAL employeebrought to light several human rights cases that ONUSAL had failed topublicize. Another striking example of reliance on international actors is theunprecedented Truth Commission, which is staffed by the United Nations.The Truth Commission was established to investigate serious acts andpatterns of violence during the war and to present a public report ofits findings and recommendations, including possible prosecutions. Thegovernment and the FMLN decided that the three members of the commissionwould be foreigners, named by the U.N. Secretary-General to ensure theirobjectivity.(37) The commission has had a daunting daunt?tr.v. daunt��ed, daunt��ing, dauntsTo abate the courage of; discourage. See Synonyms at dismay.[Middle English daunten, from Old French danter, from Latin task, with just sixmonths - later extended to eight - to prepare a definitive report on 12years of political violence in El Salvador. The Truth Commission hasaccepted information from NGOs, the Salvadoran Armed Forces Human RightsOffice and foreign governments, including the United States. It has alsoaccepted direct testimony from thousands of individuals, and isconducting its own investigations into a number of particularlynotorious acts of violence. The fact that the Truth Commission is an international rather thana Salvadoran organization again raises the question of dependence of theprocess on external factors. A similar effort at truth-telling - theRettig Commission in Chile - did have an impact on moving some casesforward in the Chilean legal system. That report's credibility,however, was due in part to the fact that its authors and staff wereentirely Chilean and represented a broad range of politicalviewpoints.(38) The task of the Salvadoran commission is even moredifficult, however, and its impact will necessarily be different. Thepurpose of the Truth Commission is to break with El Salvador'stradition of impunity and a non-functioning judicial system, while theChilean commission sought to recover a well-established judicialtradition. Under its mandate granted by the accords, the Truth Commission wasurged to consider "the need to create trust in the positive changesthat drive the peace process and to stimulate the move toward nationalreconciliation."(39) The Truth Commission's credibility willdepend upon the degree to which it can provide a rigorous, truthfulaccount of the more controversial cases; its impact will depend on theconflicting parties' acceptance of the its findings. It remains tobe seen whether an international commission can encourage both sides totake responsibility for their past actions, promoting the process ofreconciliation by raising the level of mutual trust. Some evidence brought to light by the Truth Commission will bedifficult to dismiss from almost any quarter. For example, forensicanthropologists were allowed to participate on behalf of the TruthCommission - after international pressure - in the exhumation of nearly1000 civilians killed in the 1981 massacre at El Mozote El Mozote is a village in the Moraz��n department in El Salvador. It was the site of the El Mozote massacre in December 1981 when nearly 1,000 civilians were killed by the US-trained Atlacatl battalion backed by the Salvadoran government. . The foreignexperts'initial findings - the vast majority of skeletons wereyoung children - will be difficult to refute, and should help confirm anepisode that Salvadoran and U.S. policy makers have long tried todeny.(40) The Truth Commission is expected to release its report in March1993. The public response to the findings should be even greater thanwas the case with the Ad Hoc Commission, given that the TruthCommission's report will be publicly available and extensivelydocumented. The findings should stimulate a vociferous debate about thenature and extent of abuses by both the government and the FMLN. Anyrecommendations for prosecution in particular cases, however, are likelyto be undercut by a future amnesty law An amnesty law is any law that retroactively exempts a select group of people, usually military leaders and government leaders, from criminal liability for crimes committed.[1]Most allegations involve human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. .(41) Technical Assistance Although ONUSAL quickly became the lead U.N. mission to ElSalvador, it has depended upon the main technical assistance agency ofthe United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP UNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDP Uni��n Nacional para la Democracia y el Progreso (National Union for Democracy and Progress)), tocoordinate the material and technical aspects of institution building.UNDP has had to respond to demands for assistance that it was notdesigned to handle; UNDP generally works with governments and carriesout development programs rather than emergency relief. The formation ofnew institutions in El Salvador, particularly the new civilian policeforce, has required that technical assistance programs be carried out inclose consultation not only with the government, but also with the FMLN.When contingencies have arisen, such as the urgent need for logisticalsupport for FMLN combatants who had been concentrated in camps duringthe cease-fire, UNDP was not able to respond as quickly as needed as neededprn. See prn order. . Theseexperiences suggest that the United Nations should either empowerspecial missions such as ONUSAL to provide the necessary material andtechnical assistance, or focus attention on how UNDP can respond morequickly and deal more effectively with non-state actors.(42) Prospects for the Future In the near future, ONUSAL's presence in the country alone -not to mention the political costs involved - renders any resumption ofhostilities in El Salvador virtually impossible. Much remains to bedone, however, to ensure full implementation of the peace accords beforethe March 1994 elections, after which ONUSAL will leave El Salvador. Itis likely that international pressures - including those from theClinton administration Noun 1. Clinton administration - the executive under President Clintonexecutive - persons who administer the law - will diminish. At the same time, more problemsin the implementation of the accords are sure to develop, and lingeringquestions about the success of peace-building could remain unresolved.In addition, the Truth Commission's report will likely provoke asubstantial polemic po��lem��ic?n.1. A controversial argument, especially one refuting or attacking a specific opinion or doctrine.2. A person engaged in or inclined to controversy, argument, or refutation.adj. between the Salvadoran military and its foes.Further agrarian conflicts may also arise, especially if landdistribution and legalization LEGALIZATION. The act of making lawful. 2. By legalization, is also understood the act by which a judge or competent officer authenticates a record, or other matter, in order that the same may be lawfully read in evidence. Vide Authentication. of land tenure in the former conflictzones continue at their present slow pace. More fundamentally, ONUSAL will have to use its remaining time inEl Salvador to develop ways to strengthen national institutions,especially the judiciary and the police. At least two scenarios can beimagined. in the first case, current efforts by ONUSAL to work quietlywith judges, offering training and technical skills could help promotereal change. Over time, if military prerogatives gradually erode, theindependence of the police gradually increases and more criminals areprosecuted, then the average Salvadoran citizen may place his trust inthe country's administration of justice. If the judicial systemremains corrupt, however, then the positive gains created by a new, morecompetent police force will be nullified nul��li��fy?tr.v. nul��li��fied, nul��li��fy��ing, nul��li��fies1. To make null; invalidate.2. To counteract the force or effectiveness of. . Clearly, these potentialproblems are due more to the insufficiency INSUFFICIENCY. What is not competent; not enough. of reforms outlined in theaccords than to the actual performance of ONUSAL. Public confidence in the administration of justice may also weakenshould the slightly improved current situation return to the status quoante Status quo ante, Latin for, "the way things were before," incorporating the term status quo, may refer to: In law, the objective of a temporary restraining order or a rescission in which the situation is restored to "the state in which previously" it existed after ONUSAL leaves. If this happens, then ONUSAL's presencewill have provided only a band-aid effect, prohibiting egregious e��gre��gious?adj.Conspicuously bad or offensive. See Synonyms at flagrant.[From Latin abusesby the state only as long as ONUSAL remains in the country. If localcriminals cannot be caught and punished while ONUSAL is activelyinvestigating cases - a situation that has frequently occurred since itsinstallation - what guarantees are there for justice once ONUSAL hasleft? Alternatively, Salvadorans could grow more accustomed to certainstandards of justice over time, fostered by the strong presence andactions of ONUSAL. When ONUSAL is gone, significant acts of politicalviolence and governmental abuses would generate citizen outrage andpressures for the system to respond. A lack of governmental responsecould, in turn, highlight the need for further systemic reforms. Thisscenario would imply that a new political culture had indeed taken rootas a result of the U.N. intervention in the peace process. The delays and dilemmas of peace-building in postwar El Salvadorpoint to the need for a better developed consensus on reforms.Verification by ONUSAL stimulated a process whereby electoral, militaryand judicial legislative proposals were eventually brought into closerconformity with the peace accords, although the reforms still fell shortof the accords' original intent. It is quite possible that thisdynamic, in which a legislative majority understands that compromise isbetter in the long run than imposing one's political agenda on theminority, will continue after ONUSAL has left. Nonetheless, the outcomeof the March 1994 presidential, assembly and municipal elections will becrucial to the ultimate success of the peace accords. These electionswill be the first in which the FMLN will participate as a formalpolitical party, and as such will be the first test of the real strengthof the various political forces in El Salvador. Should a more cohesive,better organized Salvadoran Left emerge in the electoral arena, thepre-electoral period would also test the depth of commitment of theSalvadoran Right - now donated by ARENA - to the new rules of the game.Experience suggests little optimism that a clear victory by the Right in1994 will augur augur:see omen. a continuation of democratizing reforms. If a broadcenter-left coalition were to win control of the Legislative Assembly,however, a rollback A DBMS feature that reverses the current transaction out of the database, returning the data to its former state. A rollback is performed when processing a transaction fails at some point, and it is necessary to start over. See two-phase commit. of the reforms by an ARENA president would beimpossible. Lessons for the United Nations This case has focused debate on how active a role the UnitedNations can or should play in constructing durable solutions to internalconflicts. Other than a few critics from the Salvadoran extreme Right,few would deny the merits of the United Nations' decision to becomeheavily involved in building the peace in El Salvador. U.N. mediationduring the peacemaking phase, along with the promise of U.N.verification of the accords, helped to end 12 years of fratricidal frat��ri��cide?n.1. The killing of one's brother or sister.2. One who has killed one's brother or sister.[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin war.Early U.N. deployment of human rights monitors helped to create aclimate more conducive to a negotiated end to the conflict, andcontributed to a reduced incidence of violence against civilians.Ongoing U.N. mediation and verification efforts also helped to avoidcrises during implementation. As of this writing, El Salvador stands outfor its successful completion of a more than year-long cease-fire, whichconcluded with the full demobilization of the FMLN guerrilla army inDecember 1992. Although considerable uncertainty remains regarding theoutcome of the structural reforms, successful implementation of thesemeasures would convert El Salvador into one of the most democratic andadvanced countries in Latin America. Some observers have extended Boutros-Ghali's concept ofpeace-building to proposals for various forms of U.N. conservatorship ConservatorshipA circumstance in which the court declares an individual unable to take care of legal matters and appoints another individual, known as a conservator, to do so.Notes:This is sometimes referred to as "LPS Conservatorship. over states that have failed to maintain legitimate governance overtheir territories.(43) The first lesson for the United Nations to takefrom its experience in El Salvador is that it must approach any sucheffort with great caution about the hazards and limitations involved.Although in many ways El Salvador presents an unusually promisingsetting for U.N.-assisted peace-building, attempts at majorinstitutional changes in the country have been repeatedly frustrated.Ultimately, the ability of the United Nations to promote lastinginstitutional changes is limited by the fact that it cannot replacenational institutions. The United Nations faces a critical dilemma. The more involved itbecomes in crafting new institutions and solving internal problems, thegreater the risk that it will encourage dependency on externalgovernance rather than promote indigenous solutions to conflicts.Extensive U.N. involvement may even be counterproductive. In apeace-building context, the experience of El Salvador shows that theUnited Nations must depend upon the political will of the incumbentgovernment to carry out reforms. U.N. leverage over a recalcitrant recalcitrantadjective Poorly responsive to therapy government may ironically depend on the United Nations' ability toissue a credible threat to withdraw its peace-building support in theevent of non-compliance. Just as the United States found it problematicto admit failure and abandon its multi-billion dollar investment in ElSalvador, the United Nations may be less inclined to exercise thisleverage as it commits more time and resources to a given situation. Second, the Salvadoran case reinforces the need for the UnitedNations to develop a body of experts experienced in peace-buildingefforts. Continuity of personnel is especially critical, given thecomplexities and differences of each conflict situation. As the UnitedNations becomes involved in similar peace-building missions elsewhere,the expertise and experience gained in El Salvador should be evaluatedto consider their utility in other contexts.(44) Personnel continuity would also facilitate the verificationresponsibilities of a U.N. mission such as ONUSAL. With one exception,those ONUSAL personnel principally responsible for monitoring complianceof the political accords had not been involved in the negotiations.Lacking this insight, they were not always able to provide an immediateinterpretation of disputed points in the accords, forced to wait insteadfor clarification from U.N. headquarters. In future U.N. efforts, itwould be helpful to plan for some continuity of senior personnel fromthe initial peacemaking phase through subsequent peacekeeping andpeace-building efforts. Similarly, it is clear in hindsight that theearly creation and staffing of a political division within ONUSAL tomonitor and mediate the various issues that fell outside the realm ofthe human rights, police and military divisions would have greatlyfacilitated ONUSAL's verification efforts. Third, the experience in El Salvador demonstrates thatpost-conflict situations may require the United Nations to break out oftraditional paradigms and consider more creative and flexible responses.While it may not be standard practice for a U.N. agency to engage inregular public criticism of a host government's activities - itshuman rights performance, for example - this action is needed ifverification is to have real impact. There is an understandable fearthat outspoken criticism by the United Nations of one party to aconflict might damage the United Nations' ability to appear as anobjective, neutral mediator. In situations in which the United Nationsis called upon to act simultaneously as mediator and verifier in apost-conflict situation, however, it should explore the possibility ofmaking different sections of a mission accountable to distinct U.N.bodies, thereby deflecting criticism of the U.N. effort as a whole.While the actions of one section will admittedly affect the publicperception of another, efforts could be made to publicize the separationbetween these roles. Finally, the Salvadoran case clearly illustrates the importance ofa powerful U.N. verification role in any peace settlement that involvessignificant redistribution of resources or institutional reforms. U.N.peacemakers This article is about the pacifist organization. For other meanings, see Peacemaker (disambiguation). Peacemakers was an American pacifist organization. should attempt to anticipate the various elements of a peaceagreement that will require verification and insist on a specificallydefined mandate for U.N. oversight. This mandate should clearly spellout the responsibilities of the parties to the verifying agencies andthe roles of the verification personnel. The ONUSAL experiencedemonstrates, however, that it is difficult to anticipate all the areasin which disagreements may arise. Therefore, a U.N. verification roleshould be defined with sufficient breadth and flexibility to authorizeevaluation of conduct in areas of dispute not originally foreseen. A basic dilemma for the United Nations in promoting peace in ElSalvador was that to achieve a peace agreement in the first place, itwas necessary to sidestep side��step?v. side��stepped, side��step��ping, side��stepsv.intr.1. To step aside: sidestepped to make way for the runner.2. many difficult issues and leave importantdetails unresolved. Yet it has been these details - especially thoserelated to land redistribution, institutional reforms and procedures forverifying the accords - that have most undercut the ability of theUnited Nations to promote national consensus and lasting changes. Thistrade-off was unavoidable in the Salvadoran case and inevitably willrecur in other settings. Perhaps the most important lesson from ElSalvador is that peacemaking and peace-building phases are ultimatelylinked: U.N. peacemakers must always bear in mind that, despite the manypressures of the initial peacemaking phases, issues left unresolved atthe outset may later require aggressive, high-profile actions by U.N.peace-builders. Such measures may put the United Nations increasingly inconflict with one or more parties to an agreement.(1) Research by William Stanley See: Sir William Stanley (?-1495) -Brother of Thomas Stanley, 1st Earl of Derby); fought at the Battle of Bosworth Field Sir William Stanley bt. (1548—1630) - English military commander, under Queen Elizabeth I William Stanley, 6th Earl of Derby (bef. for this article was made possible bya grant from the United Stafes Institute of Peace. The authors aloneshare responsibility for the content of the article. (2.) Speech by U.N.Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "La Larga Larga may refer to several villages in Romania: Larga, a village in Dofteana Commune, Bacău County Larga, a village in Samarineşti Commune, Gorj County Larga, a village in Suciu de Sus Commune, Maramureş County Noche Ha Llegadoa Su Fin," (Mexico City: 16 January 1992) included in thecollection Acuerdos Hacia Una Nueva Nacion (San Salvador: FMLN, April1992) p. 151. Translation by the authors. The agreements signed atChapultepec were the last of six sets of agreements made over the courseof almost two years. The Geneva and Caracas Accords of April and May1990, respectively, set out procedural matters. The first substantiveaccord was the San Jose Accord on Human Rights, signed in July of 1990.This was followed by the Mexico Accords of April 1991, which laid out aseries of constitutional reforms that were subsequently by theLegislative Assembly. The New York Accord of September 1991 the NationalCommission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) and set out a seriesof basic understandings subsequently elaborated in the final ChapultepecAccord. The term "accords" henceforth refers to the cumulativecontent of all six sets of agreements. (3.) It should be noted that theU.N. Security Council demonstrated considerable foresight in providingONUSAL with a sweeping mandate "to monitor all agreements concludedbetween the two parties." See Security Council Resolution 693(1991) operative paragraph 2. This allowed ONUSAL to adjust its role asnecessary, without having to repeatedly renegotiate re��ne��go��ti��ate?tr.v. re��ne��go��ti��at��ed, re��ne��go��ti��at��ing, re��ne��go��ti��ates1. To negotiate anew.2. To revise the terms of (a contract) so as to limit or regain excess profits gained by the contractor. its mandate withU.N. headquarters. (4.) Boutros-Ghali defines post-conflictpeace-building as "action to identify and support structures thatwill tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapseinto conflict." He also asserts that both peacemaking andpeacekeeping operations must include such activities in order to betruly successful. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York:United Nations, 1992) pp. 11 and 32. (5.) Ibid., p. 32. (6.) The U.N.High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was engaged in peace-buildinglong before the accords were readied, through assistance to refugees andthe internally displaced. (7.) For a good anal sis of the post-offensivepolitical situation, see Tom Gibb and Frank Smyth, El Salvaydor: IsPeace Possible? (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America,April 1990). (8.) The ARENA party controls the executive and,effectively, the legislature and judiciary. Both the 1980 presidentialand 1991 Legislative Assembly elections were held under conditions ofviolence and intimidation, in which significant elements of thepolitical left, particularly in rural areas, did not participate.Nonetheless, the March 1991 elections did provide small leftist partieswith some representation in the Assembly, leaving ARENA with less than amajority, although it generally controls the legislature by means of acoalition with two smaller right-wing parties. (9.) "Acuerdos deGinebra," Acuerdos de El Salvador: En El Camino de la Paz La Paz, city, BoliviaLa Paz(lä päs), city (1992 pop. 713,378), W Bolivia, administrative capital (since 1898) and largest city of Bolivia. The legal capital is Sucre. (NewYork: United Nations, 1992) pp. 1-3. (10.) The accord stated: "Thepurpose of the mission shall be to investigate the human rightssituation in El Salvador as regards acts committed or situationsexisting from the date of its establishment and to take any steps itdeems appropriate to promote and defend such rights" (emphasisadded). Official translation of paragraph 13 of the San Jose Accord fromthe United Nations, Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division,U.N. Doc. A/46/955; S/24375 (New York: United Nations, 12 August 1992).The parties were obligated under the accords to provide any informationrequested by ONUSAL, and to give early consideration to itsrecommendations. (11.) United Nations, First Report of the UnitedNations Observer Mission in El Salvador, U.N. Doc. A/45/1055; S/213037New York: United Nations, 16 September 1991) pp. 2-4. (12.)Constitutional amendments in El Salvador require the approval of twoconsecutive assemblies. Quick passage of these measures made it possiblefor constitutional reforms to be in place prior to a cease-fire. (13.)COPAZ was to be made up of two representatives each from the Salvadorangovernment and the FMLN, plus representatives from each of the politicalparties in the Legislative Assembly. (14.) Boutros-Ghali has describedthe calendar of implementation as "an intricately designed andcarefully negotiated mechanism whose purpose is to synchronize See synchronization. (a) thereintegration reintegration/re��in��te��gra��tion/ (-in-te-gra��shun)1. biological integration after a state of disruption.2. restoration of harmonious mental function after disintegration of the personality in mental illness. of the FMLN's ex-combatants into civilian life and(b) the measures that the Government has committed itself to take inorder to facilitate that process." See United Nations, Report ofthe Secretary-General to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23999 (NewYork: United Nations, 26 May 1992) paragraph 55. (15.) The most seriousissues had to do with land: FMLN supporters had occupied some landsafter the cease-fire and government forces had forcibly forc��i��ble?adj.1. Effected against resistance through the use of force: The police used forcible restraint in order to subdue the assailant.2. Characterized by force; powerful. evicted some ofthem, threatening the cease-fire. Neither side concentrated their forceson time. See United Nations, report of the Secretary-General on theUnited Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, U.N. Doc. S/23999 (NewYork: United Nations, 26 May 1992) pp. 2-3,8-9. (16.) Among the pointsagreed to were the demobilization of the first 20 percent of theFMLNY's forces on 31 June 1992, which was delayed by two months; acommitment by President Cristiani to derogate der��o��gate?v. der��o��gat��ed, der��o��gat��ing, der��o��gatesv.intr.1. To take away; detract: an error that will derogate from your reputation.2. legislation previously.passed by the ARENA-dominated Assembly, which had violated the accordsin Keeping the Treasury Police and National Guard legally intact; and anagreement by the government that no ex-National Guard or Treasury Policewould try to enter the PNC. Interview with ONUSAL official, SanSalvador, 17 June 1992. This and all subsequent interviews cited in thisarticle were conducted by one or both of the authors. (17.)ONUSAL's report gave legitimacy to U.S. congressional concerns: Forexample, it permitted the chairman of the House Foreign OperationsSubcommittee to place a hold on aid to El Salvador in June 1991 untilthe government showed greater compliance. "Lawmaker Holding Up U.S.Aid to El Salvador," Miami Herald, 5 June 1992, p. 12A. (18.)Interview with ONUSAL official, San Salvador, 29 May 1992. (19.) UnitedNations, ONUSAL, Fourth Report of the Director of the Human RightsDivision, U.N. Docs. A/46/935; S/24006 (New York: United Nations, 5 June1992) pp. 14-15. (20.) Supreme Court justices and members of theNational Council on the Judiciary will be elected by a two-thirds voteof the Legislative Assembly. The debate regarding the National Councilcentered on the extent to which the Supreme Court or its entities wouldbe represented on the Council. A critique of the reforms and theirimplementation can be found in the November 1992 report of U.N. HumanRights Independent Expert Pedro Nikken, a prominent Venezuelan jurist A judge or legal scholar; an individual who is versed or skilled in law.The term jurist is ordinarily applied to individuals who have gained respect and recognition by their writings on legal topics. juristn. .See Pedro Nikken, Situacion de los Derechos Humanos en El Salvador, U.N.Doc. A/47/596 (New York: United Nations, 13 November 1992) paragraphs148-78. (21.) Margaret Popkin, "The Judicial System After the PeaceAccords," draft report (San Salvador: (October 1992) pp. 1-17.(22.) See Americas Wacth, El Salvador: Peace and Human Rights: Successesand Shortcomings of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador(ONUSAL), 4, no. 8 (2 September (1992) p. 10. Cynthia Amson and DavidHoliday were co-authors of that report. (23.) The members of the Ad HocCommission are Abraham Rodriguez, a respected businessman and closeadviser to former President Jose Napoleon Duarte; Eduardo Molina, one ofthe founders of the Christian Democratic Party This is a list of Christian Democratic parties, i.e. political parties that are part of the Christian Democratic movement and advocate policies based on the principles of Christian Democracy. ; and Reynaldo GalindoPohl, an elder statesman who has served in numerous international postsin recent decades. The ultra-conservative El Salvador News Gazettereported in June 1992: "It was feared that the Ad Hoc Commissionwould be made up of persons antagonistic antagonisticadjective Referring to any combination of 2 or more drugs, which results in a therapeutic effect that is less than the sum of each drug's effect. Cf Additive, Synergism. to the armed forces and that animpartial and objective evaluation would be impossible. The acceptanceof this clause of the sanitization sanitization/san��i��ti��za��tion/ (-ti-za��shun) the process of making or the quality of being made sanitary. san��i��ti��za��tionn. of the armed forces was considered aserious concession by the government to the FMLN. When the names of themembers of the Commission were announced...all said fearsvanished." Mario Rosenthal, "Sanitizing the ArmedForces," El Salvador News-Gazette, 18-24 May 1992, p. 1. (24.)Interviews with Salvadoran and U.S. military officers, San Salvador,24-25 September and 6 and 19 October 1992. (25.) See letter of theSecretary-General to the President of the U.N. Security Council, 7January 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25078 (New York: United Nations, January1993). (26.) The estimation of the PNC as the most significant,"transcendental" institution created by the accords is sharedby David Escobar Galindo, a key member of the government's teamduring the negotiations. Television interview transcribed in Insistem,San Salvador, 15 June 1992. (27.) The Salvadoran government was alsoslow in preparing a budget and operational plans for the first two yearsof operation of the PNC itself. This has delayed international supportfor establishing the new force. So far, only the United States hascommitted funds, amounting to $6 million of an anticipated $137 millionbudget for the first two years. Interview with United Nations official,San Salvador, 18 November 1992. (28.) Unlike COPAZ, in which there is adeadlock, the ANSP Director is permitted to vote in the AcademicCouncil, making a 54 majority for the government. Furthermore, due to apolitical miscalculation mis��cal��cu��late?tr. & intr.v. mis��cal��cu��lat��ed, mis��cal��cu��lat��ing, mis��cal��cu��latesTo count or estimate incorrectly.mis��cal on its part, the FMLN is not directlyrepresented on the Council. Its proxy, who heads a small politicalparty, does not attend regularly and his replacement cannot vote. Inaddition, the Academy Director has consistently ignored communicationsfrom the COPAZ subcommission on the PNC and, according to members of theAcademic Council, has repeatedly made misrepresentations in apparentefforts to prevent them from challenging his decisions. Interviews withmembers of COPAZ subcommission on the PNC and ANSP Academic Council, SanSalvador, 10 and 18 September, 23 October and 16 November 1992. (29.)Additionally, the Academy Director had not allowed a representative ofONUSAL to attend meetings of the Academic Council, a problem that, inthe view of ONUSAL officials, has contributed to the ease with which theAcademy has violated the accords. Recently, an agreement has beenreached for ONUSAL officials to attend all Council meetings. (30.)Nikken, pp. 334. (31.) Nikken said of COPAZ that its "functioninghas been slow; its organization, deficient; and its management, of lessutility than that foreseen, since it has not even complied with theelaboration of various draft bills for which it is responsible."See ibid., paragraph 29. Translation by the authors. (32.) The partiessupportive of the government in COPAZ include ARENA, the NationalConciliation conciliation:see mediation. Party (PCN 1. PCN - Program Composition Notation.2. (communications) PCN - Personal Communication Network. ) and the Authentic Christian Movement (MAC).Those forming the opposition include the Democratic Convergence (DC),the Christian Democratic Party (PDC (1) (Primary Domain Controller) A Windows NT/2000 service that manages security for its local domain. Every domain has one PDC, which contains a database of usernames, passwords and permissions. ) and the National Democratic Union(UDN UDN Uni��n Democr��tica NacionalistaUDN Universal Domain NetworkUDN Unreal Developer NetworkUDN Ubiquity Developer NetworkUDN University Developers Network ). The makeup of COPAZ subcomissions generally parallels that ofCOPAZ, although the government and FMLN have only one representativeeach on some subcommissions and neither is represented on thesubcommission on electoral matters. (33.) Interview with member of COPAZsubcommission on electoral reforms, San Salvador, 9 September 1992. Afundamental problem with COPAZ is that its members are subject to tepolitical discipline of their organizations or parties, yet do not havesufficient authority to negotiate, adjust their positions andwork-constructively towards consensus. It appears that more consensusbuilding and compromise has taken place within the bilateralgovernment-FMLN negotiations than in COPAZ. (34.) Interview withopposition legislator LEGISLATOR. One who makes laws. 2. In order to make good laws, it is necessary to understand those which are in force; the legislator ought therefore, to be thoroughly imbued with a knowledge of the laws of his country, their advantages and defects; to , San Salvador, 9 September 1992. (35.) Interviewwith ON-USAL official, San Salvador, 10 October 1992. (36.) Observationsof the human rights verification role of ONUSAL are taken in part fromAmericas Watch (2 September 1992); see note 22. (37.) The TruthCommission members are Belisario Betancur Belisario Betancur Cuartas (February 4, 1923, Amag��, Antioquia Department) is a Colombian statesman, the President of Colombia from 1982 to 1986. Early yearsBetancur earned a Law and Economics degree from the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana in Medell��n in 1947. , former president of Colombia;Reinaldo Figueredo, former foreign minister of Venezuela; and ThomasBuergenthal, professor of law and honorary president of theInter-American Institute for Human Rights in Costa Rica. Betancur is thepresident of the Truth Commission. (38.) This observation was made toone of the authors by Margaret Crahan of Occidental College in June1992. Also see Americas Watch, Human Rights and the Politics ofAgreements:" Chile During President Aylwin's First Year (NewYork: Americas Watch, (July 1991) pp. 17-35. (39.) Acuerdos deMexico," in Acuerdos de El Salvador: En El Camino de la Paz (NewYork: United Nations,June 1992) p. 31. (40.) For background on the ElMozote case, see Americas Watch, "El Salvador: The Massacre at ElMozote: The Need to Remember," (New York: Americas Watch, 4 March1992). (41.) One amnesty law, the Law of National Reconciliation, wasapproved on 23 January 1992 by the Legislative Assembly, but exemptedthose cases that might be taken up by the Truth Commission as well ascases tried by a jury (such as the case of the murder of the Jesuitpriests). That law also provided for another possible amnesty after theTruth Commission presents its report. (42.) The authors are indebted toPeter Sollis, a development expert and consultant to the WashingtonOffice on Latin America, for the observations in this section. (43.)See, for example, Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "SavingFailed States," Foreign Policy, 89 (Winter 1992-93) pp. 3-20. (44.)Many of the human rights, legal and political observers had no realexperience to prepare them for the demands of ONUSAL.