Collective security in Europe after the Cold War.

Collective security in Europe after the Cold War. We shall see how the counsels of prudence and restraint may becomethe prime agents of mortal danger Mortal Danger by Eileen Wilks is the 4th novel in the World of the Lupi series. It was released on November 1st, 2005.It was nominated for the 2005 Romantic Times Best Werewolf Romance Novel. Plot summaryFormer homicide cop Lily Yu has a lot on her plate. ; how the middle course adopted fromdesires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to thebull's eye of disaster. We shall see how absolute is the need of abroad path of international action pursued by many states in commonacross the years Across The Years is one of a few ultrarunning festivals still taking place in the USA. Founded in 1983 by Harold Sieglaff the race has changed over the years in location as well as organisation. Today the race is held at Nardini Manor about 45 minutes from downtown Phoenix, AZ. , irrespective of irrespective ofprep.Without consideration of; regardless of.irrespective ofpreposition despitethe ebb and flow the alternate ebb and flood of the tide; often used figuratively.See also: Ebb of national politics.Winston Churchill, 1947(2) Collective security suffers a tarnished reputation. The monumentalfailure of die principle of collective security as reflected by theLeague of Nations is the main image left to us from the 1930s. Theendless bickering and futile posturing of the United Nations during theCold War period further discredited the idea of collective security. What did seem to work in the past was collective defense -alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO), established under the North Atlantic Treaty (Apr. 4, 1949) by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. pledging to defendeach member-state from external aggression. Behind these shields ofcollective defense was the sword of nuclear deterrence Noun 1. nuclear deterrence - the military doctrine that an enemy will be deterred from using nuclear weapons as long as he can be destroyed as a consequence; "when two nations both resort to nuclear deterrence the consequence could be mutual destruction" , constantly onthe alert, constantly honed and strengthened by the addition of new andimproved weapons systems. But suddenly, with the disappearance of theso-called Evil Empire that the American-led alliances were designed tocontain, a long-buried question is being posed once again: Can theinternational community join in sufficient numbers, strength and will todeter, and if necessary, to roll back aggression and settle internalconflicts, and leave in their place international peace and security? Nowhere is the need for order more apparent than in Eurasia. Theformer Yugoslavia is ablaze; Moldova and the Caucasus have seen armedconflict and more may be in store; Central Asia has already demonstratedserious instabilities; and the Baltic states are suffering from economicdislocations and disputes with Moscow over Russian troop withdrawals andthe rights of ethnic Russians. Russia's government, conversely, isunder heavy pressure from conservative and nationalistic elements. TheCentral and East European countries have not yet succeeded in completingtheir economic transition, and the current influx of refugees andasylum-seekers is threatening to destabilize de��sta��bi��lize?tr.v. de��sta��bi��lized, de��sta��bi��liz��ing, de��sta��bi��liz��es1. To upset the stability or smooth functioning of: governments in most ofWestern Europe Western EuropeThe countries of western Europe, especially those that are allied with the United States and Canada in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (established 1949 and usually known as NATO). , including the recently unified Germany. Contributing to,and potentially exacerbating, the instability is U.S. uncertainty aboutits commitment to European security, and the increasingly apparentbankruptcy of European and multilateral institutions in coping with thewar in the Balkans. Recent events in international affairs Noun 1. international affairs - affairs between nations; "you can't really keep up with world affairs by watching television"world affairsaffairs - transactions of professional or public interest; "news of current affairs"; "great affairs of state" have highlighted a need foran intellectual and political framework to help the internationalcommunity understand its stake in the crises and conflicts that areerupting from Central Europe Central Europe is the region lying between the variously and vaguely defined areas of Eastern and Western Europe. In addition, Northern, Southern and Southeastern Europe may variously delimit or overlap into Central Europe. to Central Asia. The war in the formerYugoslavia has shown that neither the collective defense system of NATO NATO:see North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATOin full North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationInternational military alliance created to defend western Europe against a possible Soviet invasion. nor the economic integration of the European Community has been trulyrelevant to this crisis. In this new era of the international system,voices are being raised against the notion of collective security,reiterating once again its flawed theories and policy deficiencies.(3)The discredited idea of collective security, however, deserves newconsideration under the unforeseen circumstances of the post-cold Warworld. In this essay, a contemporary and realizable definition ofcollective security will be offered, beginning with the assertion thatcollective security is a strategy and a process that is not now, andpossibly may never be, a condition. Cost-benefit analyses require thatcollective security operations be considered on a case-by-case basis,pursued in some situations but not in others. Collective security issuggested here as one conflict-solving strategy available to governmentsthat is, in principle, more responsive to post-Cold War securityproblems than other strategies, such as balance-of-power. A new challenge for peace and security is the question ofintrastate conflict, where it appears that the international communityis moving toward the establishment of norms that justify intervention ina state's internal affairs Internal affairs may refer to: Internal affairs of a sovereign state. Internal affairs (law enforcement), a division of a law enforcement agency which investigates cases of lawbreaking by members of that agency . It will be suggested here that while anautomatic response to every violation of international norms isunrealistic and inappropriate, the threshold of reaction to the carnagein the former Yugoslavia is too high to support the positive evolutionof international norms. Therefore, criteria that would endow collectivesecurity with more doctrinal content and a basis for judging whethermilitary intervention The deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy. is justified in particular cases will be examined. Finally, it will be suggested that in Eurasia a system of spheresof interest dominated by regional hegemons is the most likelyalternative to a functioning collective security regime. Theimplications of this choice should be well understood by the public, forit implies a return to great power competition and conflict. Yugoslavia: a Fatal Blow to Collective Security? A contemporary look at collective security must begin with theacknowledgement that the very concept has been catastrophically damagedby its first major post-cold War test in Europe. The war in the formerYugoslavia was from the very beginning a classic case for collectiveaction. Indeed, there was collective action by the European Community,and later by the United Nations. Yet at every step of the way from thepre-conflict phase of the crisis to the desperate Bosnian winter of1992-93, collective action was too little, too late. The crisis in the Balkans was a long time in coming. Experts on thecountry had predicted that the Yugoslav federation would disintegratewhen Tito died. At the price of devolution of authority and risingnationalism, the federation survived well beyond his death in 1980.Nationalism was fueled after the East European revolutions of 1989 byleaders who were anxious to hold onto power, and whose championing ofnationalistic ideologies in place of communist ideologies promoted thedisintegration of the federation. By early 1991, Croatia and Sloveniawere seeking to loosen the bonds of the 1974 constitution and torearrange Yugoslavia into a loose confederation, or into a Balkanversion of the E.C. To this idea, Slobodan Milosevic, the president ofSerbia, asserted that changes in the constitutional relationships of thetype envisaged by Croatia and Slovenia would require changes in thefrontiers that Tito had imposed on the republics after the Second WorldWar. Milosevic also played to the nationalist gallery by abolishing theautonomous status of Vojvodina and Kosovo within Serbia in 1989.(4) Preventive diplomacy Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. or crisis prevention should have gone intohigh gear in 1991. It did not. Statements of concern were uttered, butno serious effort was made at conciliation conciliation:see mediation. or mediation. In the absenceof collective efforts by international organizations, what followed wasnearly inevitable. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence fromthe Yugoslav federation in June 1991. The Yugoslav People's Army <noinclude>The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) (Serbo-Croatian: Jugoslovenska narodna armija or Jugoslavenska narodna armija; Serbian and Macedonian: ,officered largely by Serbs and dedicated to upholding Tito's dreamof a united Yugoslavia, was mobilized. Slovenia departed the federationrelatively unscathed, but in Croatia, where the Yugoslav army and localSerbian militia sought to establish zones dominated by Serbs and clearroutes providing access to those zones, the fighting dragged on for sixmonths with great loss of life and much damage to historic and culturaltreasures. During this time, the E.C. had nearly all the responsibilityfor mediating an end to the fighting. The E.C. was divided in its councils over how to dissipate thecrisis. During the early phases of the Yugoslav conflict, France soughtto activate the Western European Union Western European Union(WEU), European security and defense organization. It was set up in Brussels in 1955 as a defensive, economic, social, and cultural organization, consisting of Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; for a collective securityintervention in the Balkans. Contingency planning was undertaken todispatch 30,000 troops to the former Yugoslavia, but the entire plan wasquashed when Great Britain Great Britain,officially United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, constitutional monarchy (2005 est. pop. 60,441,000), 94,226 sq mi (244,044 sq km), on the British Isles, off W Europe. The country is often referred to simply as Britain. objected, citing its experience in NorthernIreland Northern Ireland:see Ireland, Northern. Northern IrelandPart of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland occupying the northeastern portion of the island of Ireland. Area: 5,461 sq mi (14,144 sq km). Population (2001): 1,685,267. . The result was a public renunciation The Abandonment of a right; repudiation; rejection.The renunciation of a right, power, or privilege involves a total divestment thereof; the right, power, or privilege cannot be transferred to anyone else. of the threat or use offorce in any way to deal with the situation in Croatia. The attempt,furthermore, to create a cohesive European front in security matters ledto an emphasis on an untried, untested Western European Union (WEU WEU:see Western European Union. ) anda neglect of the United Nations and its peacekeeping experiences. This was not corrected until late 1991, when former U.S. secretaryof state Cyrus Vance accepted the task of representing the U.N.secretary-general in Yugoslavia. There were many reasons for his almostimmediate success, as Mr. Vance said publicly, and no reasons fordenigrating the personal talents of the Europeans who sought to bringabout a cease-fire. In any event, the first phase of the Yugoslav warended with a cease-fire - actually the fifteenth cease-fire - betweenSerbia and Croatia on 3 January 1992, and the subsequent stationing ofpeacekeeping units in Croatia.(5) This was a victory - although alimited one - for collective security. The next phase of the war was also widely foreseen. It began inApril 1992 after Bosnia and Hercegovina declared independence in areferendum that was boycotted by the Serbian population. No preventivemeasures had been taken, with the dubious exception of internationalrecognition of Bosnia and Hercegovina as a sovereign and independentstate. The war in Bosnia rapidly became even bloodier than the war inCroatia. Purported ethnic cleansing ethnic cleansingThe creation of an ethnically homogenous geographic area through the elimination of unwanted ethnic groups by deportation, forcible displacement, or genocide. and the linking together of thevarious territories to be occupied by Serbs became the object of policyof Bosnian Serbs, intent on creating their own state within Bosnia. After briefly contemplating armed intervention in the late summerof 1992, the Western powers again publicly disclaimed any idea ofpeace-enforcement.(6) Instead, acting under several Security Councilresolutions, peacekeeping forces were dispatched to Bosnia to help withthe humanitarian effort of supplying besieged cities with food andmedicine in May and June 1992 As the winter of 1992-1993 descended uponBosnia, the government of Bosnia held only the areas around a fewpopulation centers. Bosnian Serbs, with the help of equipment providedby the Yugoslav People's Army, held 70 percent of Bosnia andHercegovina, and the Croats held the rest. Under the chairmanship of Cyrus Vance for the United Nations andLord Owen for the European Community, a full-time InternationalConference on the former Yugoslavia was convened in Geneva Geneva, canton and city, SwitzerlandGeneva(jənē`və), Fr. Genève, canton (1990 pop. 373,019), 109 sq mi (282 sq km), SW Switzerland, surrounding the southwest tip of the Lake of Geneva. . Thiscollective security effort brokered a number of cease-fires - althoughfew held for long - and proposed a new constitutional order for Bosnia,which became the subject of negotiations among all the parties inJanuary 1993. In the meantime Adv. 1. in the meantime - during the intervening time; "meanwhile I will not think about the problem"; "meantime he was attentive to his other interests"; "in the meantime the police were notified"meantime, meanwhile , the United Nations established an inquiryinto war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, tightened the embargo onSerbia and Montenegro Serbia and Montenegro(sûr`bēə, mŏn'tənē`grō), Serbian Srbija i Crna Gora, former country of SE Europe, in the Balkan Peninsula, a short-lived union (2003–6) of the republics of Serbia and the much by authorizing a naval blockade Noun 1. naval blockade - the interdiction of a nation's lines of communication at sea by the use of naval powerblockade, encirclement - a war measure that isolates some area of importance to the enemy and demanded ano-fly zone over Bosnia, an order repeatedly violated by Bosnian-Serbaircraft. As of February 1993, the fate of Bosnia hangs in the balance.Whether the Bosnian Muslims can continue their organized resistance formuch longer is in grave doubt. Collapse of the defenses of Sarajevo andthe few areas left to the Muslims would no doubt bring with it wholesaleslaughter of civilians and continued guerrilla warfare guerrilla warfare(gərĭl`ə)[Span.,=little war], fighting by groups of irregular troops (guerrillas) within areas occupied by the enemy. for anundetermined period. The next phase of the war is also widely predicted. It is based onan expectation that Milosevic will take actions in Kosovo - 90 percentAlbanian - that will amount to further ethnic cleansing, because Serbsview that area as the heartland of Serbian culture Serbian culture refers to the culture of Serbia as well as the culture of Serbs in other parts of the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world. It has a strong influence from the peasantry especially in its arts, crafts and music. and history. This, inturn, could involve Macedonia - at least 20 percent Albanian - Albaniaitself, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. A full-scale European war couldthus emerge from the failure to arrest the conflict that started fromsmall beginnings. Redefining Collective Security Before deciding that the concept of collective security isobsolete, it is necessary to consider this elusive idea, and the mannerin which it might fit usefully into current circumstances. HansMorgenthau Hans Joachim Morgenthau (February 17 1904 – July 19 1980) was an International Relations theorist and one of the most influential to date. He was born in Coburg, Germany, and educated at the universities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich. , the classical theorist of realism in American politicalscience, wrote that "the organizing principle of collectivesecurity is the respect for the moral and legal obligation to consideran attack by any nation upon any member of the alliance as an attackupon all members of the alliance." Morgenthau explained that thealliance to which he referred was a "universal alliance againstpotential aggression."(8) This, of course, distinguishes collectivesecurity from a collective defense system like NATO whose membership islimited, and where the presumptive pre��sump��tive?adj.1. Providing a reasonable basis for belief or acceptance.2. Founded on probability or presumption.pre��sump aggressor AGGRESSOR, crim. law. He who begins, a quarrel or dispute, either by threatening or striking another. No man may strike another because he has threatened, or in consequence of the use of any words. during the Cold War wasalso clearly understood to be a particular nation-state. The conditions necessary for the effective implementation ofcollective security, Morgenthau believed, were very unlikely to everexist in practice. The idea of collective security is based on awillingness to use military force if necessary, in quarrels in whichmost of the so-called universal alliance have no easily - or assuredly -perceived direct stake. Furthermore, at least in Morgenthau's view,collective security is identified with defense of the status quo [Latin, The existing state of things at any given date.] Status quo ante bellum means the state of things before the war. The status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. , andthis view has been additionally supported by more contemporaryauthors.(9) In an era where the status quo has yet to be established orformally defined, E.H. Carr's comment seems to be quiteapropos ap��ro��pos?adj.Being at once opportune and to the point. See Synonyms at relevant.adv.1. At an appropriate time; opportunely.2. ,"...that few people do desire a |world state' or'collective security,' and that those who say they desire ithave different and incompatible definitions of it."(10) Collective security, however, is not necessarily a universalalliance committed to the automatic use of force anywhere in the worldagainst any aggressor no matter what the circumstances. Carr was correctin his perception of the concept of collective security entailing manydifferent shades of Noun 1. shades of - something that reminds you of someone or something; "aren't there shades of 1948 here?"reminder - an experience that causes you to remember something meaning. In this analysis, collective security willbe defined in relation to ethnic, nationalistic, communal and internalpower struggles in such places as the former Yugoslavia and theCaucasus. This analysis will commence with the suggestion of whatcollective security does not have to be. Collective security is not required to neglect or ignore thedistribution of military power in an international system. Calculationsof balance of power are less relevant to most of the conflicts alreadyon the scene in the post-Cold War world, than are hard estimates of howthese conflicts affect the development of the international order thatwill replace the bipolar order of the Cold War. Nonetheless, relationsamong the largest states will continue to be affected by militarystrength considerations, although probably not to the extent that theywere during the Cold War. Collective security can co-exist with nationalpolicies aimed at maintaining a power equilibrium so long as the latterpolicies do not drive the elements of trust and cooperation completelyout of the international system. In fact, collective security shouldwork best in a system of democratic states, which most of Eurasia isbecoming, since power balances among such states are less important thantheir shared system of governance, and these states are the most likelycontributors to collective security missions. Collective security need not be global or universal in scope. TheConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE CSCESee Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE). ), for example,has over 50 members, more than the League of Nations and about the sameas the United Nations in its early years. There is no reason why theCSCE could not be used for collective security purposes if its membersso chose. Its status as a regional agency under Chapter VIII of the U.N.Charter gives it a claim to universalism UniversalismBelief in the salvation of all souls. Arising as early as the time of Origen and at various points in Christian history, the concept became an organized movement in North America in the mid-18th century. and, if any question arose, theSecurity Council could call on the CSCE to take necessary actions in thename of the global community of nations. The geographic coverage of theCSCE - from Vancouver to Vladivostok - affords ample scope forcollective security. Collective security need not be dedicated to defending the statusquo. It would be a serious drawback to any revival of the idea if thestatus quo were to be the main focus of modern collective security. The1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE included the principle ofinviolability INVIOLABILITY. That which is not to be violated. The persons of ambassadors are inviolable. See Ambassador. of frontiers, a major preoccupation of Europeans only tooaware of the disasters that experimenting with frontiers could produce.But the Final Act also states that frontiers can be changed peacefullyand by agreement. In fact, the Final Act contributed to ending thedivision of Europe, one of the greatest assaults on the status quo inmodem European history. Carr has pointed out that "if a change isnecessary and desirable, the use or threatened use of force to maintainthe status quo may be morally more culpable Blameworthy; involving the commission of a fault or the breach of a duty imposed by law.Culpability generally implies that an act performed is wrong but does not involve any evil intent by the wrongdoer. than the use or threateneduse to alter it.(11) The validity of this point for collective security has been shownin recent Security Council decisions. A case in point was the SecurityCouncil's tolerance of the use of force in northern Iraq, sinceIraq's treatment of its Kurdish population was seen as a threat tointernational peace and security, warranting the establishment of aprotected zone in northern Iraq. The same principle was invoked in theSecurity Council's authorization of force in Somalia in December1992. Force, undertaken as the result of U.N. decisions, was used tochange the status quo in both cases. Collective security need not be limited to relations betweenstates. It may also address internal affairs within a state. The CSCEhas had a major hand in establishing norms regarding acceptable conductamong its members. These norms have not been limited to externalrelations, since individual human rights have had a prominent place onthe CSCE agenda from the beginning. More recently, the CSCE has declaredthat national minorities will enjoy the same rights and have the sameduties of citizenship as the majority of the population. A modern version of collective security must stress the organicconnection between collective security and the development ofinternational norms, as well as the enforcement of them. The Final Actof CSCE, as reinforced both by subsequent accords and by the experienceof the periodic Review Meetings as well as by state behavior, amounts toan international regime, in the language of political theory. Suchregimes, in theory, address the problem of defections from a collectivesecurity system and the problem of decentralized norm enforcement in aworld of self-interested states. Rousseau's classic story of thestag hunt In game theory, the stag hunt is a game which describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. Other names for it or its variants include "assurance game", "coordination game", and "trust dilemma". is designed to show that states, like persons, can quiterationally abandon collective duty for the sake of individual gain.Writers today still evoke this allegory to prove that collectivesecurity cannot work.(12) No one can predict in a single running of themetaphorical stag hunt whether one's partners will defect orcooperate, but there are reasons to believe that over time, strategiesof cooperation can be learned and applied.(13) An international regime can be defined as "...the principles,norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actorexpectations converge in a given issue area."(14) An effectiveregime should assist the members of a collective security system intheir individual decisions to enforce the norms of the regime. Law, ornorm, enforcement will not occur in this decade, if ever, as the resultof the centralization of authority in some supranational SupranationalAn international organization, or union, whereby member states transcend national boundariesor interests to share in the decision-making and vote on issues pertaining to the wider grouping. organization.Rather, it will occur because most members believe that the regime underwhich they are acting benefits them and that the costs of abandoning itcould be serious. As Robert Keohane Robert O. Keohane (born 1941) is an American academic and Utilitarianism theorist. Keohane helped develop the Just War Theory strand of Utilitarianism. He is currently a Professor of Political Science at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. puts it, "Institutions thatfacilitate cooperation do not mandate what governments must do; ratherthey help governments pursue their own interests throughcooperation."(15) It is debatable, of course, to what extent or for what period aninternational regime can influence state behavior. If collectivesecurity can be made to work in the years ahead, however, it will bebecause such a regime has taken hold and the enforcement of its normshas become the national interest of each of its participants. Theoutlook for such a development cannot be said to be bright, butcollective security seen as a function of a set of well-developedreciprocal expectations among a limited group of nations is a morerealistic subject for analysis than a so-called universal alliance. Collective Security and Intrastate Conflict Norms governing interstate relations are quite distinct incomparison with those affecting the common type of conflict in thepost-Cold War world. The principles of sovereignty and ofnon-interference in internal affairs, for example, are well-established.They form part of the Final Act of the CSCE and can be used to opposeinterventions in what could be described as internal affairs. The geniusof the Final Act, however, was that it dealt not only withstate-to-state relations but also with the rights of individuals withinstates, thus providing a basis for the international community toaddress internal matters. This right of intervention was exercisedfrequently after the signature of the Final Act in 1975, and was themain topic of the periodic review meetings of the CSCE. The Sovietgovernment tried to reject Western criticisms of its human rightspractices on grounds that the principle of non-interference was beingviolated. The argument was so ineffectual, however, that the Sovietssoon joined the fray, and began criticizing the U.S. human rightsrecord, thus affirming the principle that human rights were not solely amatter of internal concern but were a subject for norm-enforcementwithin an international regime. As noted earlier, the war against Iraq and Iraqi persecution of theKurds, and the anarchic situation in Somalia, provided a justificationfor Security Council decisions that also affirmed the right of theinternational community to intervene in internal affairs for support ofinternational peace and security. Thus, through actions by the CSCE andby the United Nations, human rights, minority rights and the survival ofpopulations have been declared matters of international concern, theprinciple of non-interference in internal affairs notwithstanding. An additional step was taken by the Security Council in the case ofthe former Yugoslavia to reinforce the notion of personal accountabilityfor violations of international norms. Acting at the request of theUnited States United States,officially United States of America, republic (2005 est. pop. 295,734,000), 3,539,227 sq mi (9,166,598 sq km), North America. The United States is the world's third largest country in population and the fourth largest country in area. and others, the Security Council adopted a resolution thatestablished an investigation into alleged atrocities in Bosnia. In thiscase, the international community is indicating not only that internalmatters are the proper concern of international institutions, but alsothat violators of basic human rights will be held personallyaccountable. It may be a long time before these questions are sorted out, but itappears that the international community has clearly staked out aposition that supports intervention, even armed intervention, in theinternal affairs of states. Collective security in the post-cold Warperiod, therefore, embraces a collective response to intrastateviolations of international norms in the name of international peace andsecurity, as well as the long-understood responsibility for enforcinginternational norms in relations between states. This is a major newdevelopment, which marks a conceptual departure from most collectivesecurity thinking of earlier periods. Criteria for Collective Military Intervention Collective action to enforce international norms will never beautomatic, but instead will be highly dependent upon specificcircumstances. Nonetheless, it is possible to designate criteria to beused as a guide to when military intervention should be considered.Obviously, state-on-state acts of war Tom Clancy's Op-Center: Acts of War is a technothriller by Jeff Rovin Plot introductionThe mobile Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Turkey investigates a dam blown up by Kurdish terrorists. or threats of war fit the categoryof events that are likely to be threats to international peace andsecurity. The collective security principle should be aimed at a problemthat Morgenthau saw as the main concern of diplomacy from the beginningof the modern state system to the First World War: "...to localize lo��cal��ize?v. lo��cal��ized, lo��cal��iz��ing, lo��cal��iz��esv.tr.1. To make local: decentralize and localize political authority.2. an actual or threatening conflict between two nations, in order toprevent it from spreading to other nations."(16) If a conflict amounted, however, to border skirmishes and thecombat exhibited no signs of escalation, the threshold of violence thatmany states use as an indicator might never be crossed. Governmentsoften conclude in such circumstances that the internationalization The support for monetary values, time and date for countries around the world. It also embraces the use of native characters and symbols in the different alphabets. See localization, i18n, Unicode and IDN. internationalization - internationalisation of adispute might only worsen an already disagreeable situation.Intervention in the form of mediation or conciliation might even beruled out on those grounds, and the question of military interventionwould hardly arise. Intervention becomes a more complex issue if the dispute is aninternal matter - a civil war or a struggle brought on by the collapseof the system within which a political entity previously existed. Thisis precisely the situation that prevails in many of the conflicts acrossEurasia. For this reason, the principle of collective security has beenvery difficult to invoke as a guide to action in response to thedisputes and violence that have erupted in the aftermath of the ColdWar. Criteria to judge the issue of collective intervention in Europeshould recognize that Western states, including the United States, havestrategic interests in Eurasia that are different from those they mayhave in the rest of the world. Cambodia and Somalia are two of the mosttragic examples of suffering known to human history. Intervention by theUnited Nations in both cases is fully justified. Conflicts in Eurasia,however, presumably pre��sum��a��ble?adj.That can be presumed or taken for granted; reasonable as a supposition: presumable causes of the disaster. pose a higher order of risk for the Western states.A central pillar of U.S. foreign policy should be to promote aEuro-Atlantic Community extending as far to the east in Eurasia asdemocratic developments make possible.(17) Disputes and armed conflictin this region would undermine the achievement of a supremely importantstrategic objective. This basis for judging the seriousness of a crisisand for deciding whether to intervene is fundamental to this analysis,but obviously is a matter for debate. Whether to engage in collective security military operations This is a list of missions, operations, and projects. Missions in support of other missions are not listed independently. World War I''See also List of military engagements of World War I Albion (1917) inEuropean conflicts should be judged by no less than four criteria: 1. Whether, in the absence of intervention, there is seriouspotential for wider conflict; 2. Whether there is likely to be a significantly adverse impact oninternational norms, particularly those related to the use of force tochange established frontiers; 3. Whether moral considerations such as war crimes, crimes againsthumanity or the survival of large populations come into play; and 4. Whether the survival of a democratic government is at stake. If all four of these criteria can be answered affirmatively, thecase for collective security military operations is a powerful one.Difficult decisions would still be required in each instance: Is There a Serious Potential for Wider Conflict? It is not easy to judge whether a conflict will remain localized.If there is a reasonably high probability that it cannot be confined,however, and that the conflagration will spread, intervention shouldtake place sooner rather than later. Stopping or limiting a small war iseasier than trying to affect the course of a major war. Will There be a Significant Impact on International Norms? In determining the effect of a conflict on international norms, itis tempting to cite any attempt to change frontiers by force asundermining the norms of international order. Still one must ask if agiven violation represents a precedent or a unique situation. If it ismore the latter than the former, and the circumstances of the conflictare not likely ever to be repeated, the impact on international normswill be quite small. What are the Moral Considerations? One of the more well-defined issues should be whether war crimes orcrimes against humanity are being committed. Even in this case, however,the situation may be confused as to whom or which side is actuallyresponsible. Are Democratic Governments in Danger? The survival of democratic regimes is seemingly a clear issue, butin fact, challengers to the status quo almost always promise democracy.Conflicts may also involve governments or factions that have come topower through democratic means and who subsequently oppress op��press?tr.v. op��pressed, op��press��ing, op��press��es1. To keep down by severe and unjust use of force or authority: a people who were oppressed by tyranny.2. minorities.And in some situations, neither party may be genuinely democratic. Thus the application of these criteria requires a considerableexercise of judgment. There should be nothing automatic about decisionsregarding military intervention, even with the help of criteria similarto the above. The primary utility of such parameters is to ensure thatthe implications of a serious conflict are understood in terms offundamental interests of the international community. The above-statedcriteria should fill the void between automatic responses and inactionin helping to frame issues of collective security. These criteria shouldalso help provide consistency, rather than ad hoc For this purpose. Meaning "to this" in Latin, it refers to dealing with special situations as they occur rather than functions that are repeated on a regular basis. See ad hoc query and ad hoc mode. answers to questionsregarding collective intervention - thus assisting in the reinforcementof an international regime. The Role of International Organizations in Collective Security The procedures that the international community uses to makedecisions about collective security are critical to the problems ofunderstanding the nature of a crisis situation, defining politicalobjectives and measuring the military, economic and other meansnecessary to achieve these objectives. Ambiguity is usually the hallmarkof situations resulting from intrastate conflicts. Furthermore,collective decision making frequently produces lowest-common denominatorresults, thus leading to an outcome in which military means areinadequate and political objectives are murky. Too often collectivedecision making means no decision making. There is no way around collective decision making, however, for theprevention of crises must entail extensive international consultation inadvance of hostilities. Collective security military operations requireconstant exchanges of views among the governments attempting to dealwith the conflict. The effectiveness of collective decision makingdepends upon both national government, and the internationalorganizations established to support their collective actions. In thefollowing discussion, the roles of several international organizationsin collective security operations in Eurasia will be assessed. The United Nations Yugoslavia is the first crisis on the European mainland that theUnited Nations has been asked to manage. Observers still monitor eventsin Cyprus many years after the fighting there ended, but generally,Europe during the Cold War was not a region where the United Nationsplayed much of a role. In fact, Europeans were rather smug about theirlack of a need for the United Nations to handle crises there, feelingthat their own regional institutions could cope quite well. The extentto which the United Nations will play a role in the future has yet to bedetermined, although the Yugoslav precedent suggests that the UnitedNations will be more important and necessary on the European scene thanseemed likely when the Cold War ended. The United Nations is a valuable legitimizing agent. A resolutionadopted by the Security Council can be used to justify military actionby individual nations joined in a coalition or by an alliance. Theformer was the situation in the Persian Gulf War; the latter is the casewith NATO in the Yugoslav conflict. The approval of the United Nationscarries a cachet cachet/ca��chet/ (ka-sha��) a disk-shaped wafer or capsule enclosing a dose of medicine. ca��chetn.An edible wafer capsule used for enclosing an unpleasant-tasting drug. that no other organization can bestow, and thereforecollective security operations endorsed by the United Nations can becarried out under circumstances where other organizations would bebarred. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter confers major responsibilities onthe Security Council for peace-enforcement. There is nothing comparableat present in the charters of other relevant internationalorganizations. For this reason, the United Nations is likely to becomethe premiere legitimizing authority for Eurasian collective securityoperations. Further reinforcing this trend was the decision by theHelsinki Summit of July 1992 to "declare their understanding thatthe CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of theCharter of the United Nations."(18) Unfortunately, the United Nations is stretched thin and is underfire from various quarters for alleged mismanagement mis��man��age?tr.v. mis��man��aged, mis��man��ag��ing, mis��man��ag��esTo manage badly or carelessly.mis��manage��ment n. of peacekeeping,inter alia [Latin, Among other things.] A phrase used in Pleading to designate that a particular statute set out therein is only a part of the statute that is relevant to the facts of the lawsuit and not the entire statute. .(19) Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's report, An Agendafor Peace, contains many good recommendations for strengtheningpreventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations. To begin with, theSecretary-General proposed that the Security Council begin negotiationsunder Article 43 of the Charter to have member-states assign armedforces, on a readily available basis, to the United Nations. The hardreality is that shortages of money and human resources The fancy word for "people." The human resources department within an organization, years ago known as the "personnel department," manages the administrative aspects of the employees. , not to mentionpolitical differences, are major obstacles that will not be easily orexpeditiously ex��pe��di��tious?adj.Acting or done with speed and efficiency. See Synonyms at fast1.ex overcome. Boutros-Ghali also has asked for a $1 billionreserve fund for peacekeeping.(20) The U.S. Congress and otherdemocratic legislatures, concerned with accountability, will needsignificant convincing to fund the United Nations at the exponentialrate of increase that peacekeeping demands have imposed. Something akinto a revolution in thinking will be required in order to give thatorganization the level of resources and expertise it needs to beeffective. Failure to do this will place increased burdens on otherorganizations that are not as well-placed as is the United Nations tocarry out collective security operations. It would mean forfeiting thecapability to offer plausible means of preventive diplomacy,peacekeeping, protective security or peace-enforcing in many placesacross the Eurasian land mass. These problems will become apparent inthe discussion that follows. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe The CSCE is an accident of history that fulfilled a Cold Warfunction, but has yet to show that it can adapt to post-cold Warconditions. The CSCE derived from Soviet president LeonidBrezhnev's proposal for a European security conference to place thestamp of approval on the division of Germany and of Europe. The Westsucceeded in converting this scheme into a forum for encouraging humanrights and human rights movements in the Soviet Union and East CentralEurope. This contributed to the success of the revolutions of EastCentral Europe in 1989 and thus helped to end the division of Europe.Even the West had not originally placed so much emphasis on the CSCE asa process. The transformation of the Helsinki Final Act into a vigorousand continuing process was the unexpected miracle of the wholetransaction. At the June 1991 meeting of the Council of Ministers, andespecially at the Helsinki summit meeting of July 1992, the participantsstrengthened the collective security function of the CSCE. Consensus isno longer required for calling emergency meetings. Several mechanismshave been established to encourage early consultations on emergingcrises. Investigation and rapporteur rap��por��teur?n.One who is designated to give a report, as at a meeting.[Middle English raportour, judge, from Old French raporteur, from raporter, to bring back missions have been created and usedin the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine,Moldova, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan andGeorgia.(21) The Helsinki Document of 1992 states that the CSCE could requestthat the E.C., NATO, WEU and the peacekeeping mechanisms of theCommonwealth of Independent States Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS), community of independent nations established by a treaty signed at Minsk, Belarus, on Dec. 8, 1991, by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Between Dec. 8 and Dec. (CIS Cis(sĭs), same as Kish (1.) (1) (CompuServe Information Service) See CompuServe.(2) (Card Information S ) support peacekeeping in theCSCE region. The document stipulates that contributions by suchorganizations will not affect the procedures for the establishment,conduct and command of CSCE peacekeeping operations."(22) Theseprovisions, of course, are much more restrictive than the latitude thatcould be made available to military operations under the U.N. Charter.Furthermore, if the CSCE sought the assistance of NATO in a case likethe former Yugoslavia, the NATO countries would be bound by the samerestrictions. The naval blockade of the former Yugoslavia authorized bythe Security Council in November 1992 would have been impossible toadminister under CSCE auspices.(23) The enforcement of a no-fly zoneover Bosnia, another action contemplated by discussions, would also beinfeasible. This is not to say that the kinds of crisis prevention andpeacekeeping operations that could be carried out under a CSCE mandateare of no value. Most of the peacekeeping operations that the UnitedNations has conducted in the past several decades could fit the modelpresented in the Helsinki Document. What these provisions reveal,however, is that CSCE peacekeeping is intended, as the document itselfstates, "to complement the political process of disputeresolution."(24) It is a very different concept from the ideas ofcrisis management and enforced settlements.(25) This restricted view ofthe CSCE means that it will be unavailable for use in many conflictsthroughout its area of application, and that nations contemplatingprotective security or peace-enforcement operations will have to turn tothe United Nations for a mandate. NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was a NATO organisation founded on 1991 December and was the precursor to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It initially brought together NATO and nine central and eastern European nations in a consultative forum. NATO embarked on its collective security vocation in accordancewith a mandate from the Security Council(26) The mandate authorizednations to enforce a naval blockade of Serbia and Montenegro to ensurethat the sanctions on strategic goods earlier imposed by the UnitedNations were fully effective.(27) The blockade began late in theafternoon of 22 November 1992. By the end of the first day, 23 November,Western warships had stopped and inspected three merchant ships. This was a significant threshold in NATO's history. Forcesassigned to NATO had been used in coalitions led by the United States,the Gulf War being the main case in point. This was the first time,however, that NATO as a collective-defense alliance, had decided to useits forces in an authorized military operation in Europe. It may not bethe last, as NATO spokespersons have been calling for greater NATOinvolvement in collective security operations. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NATO)NACC National Association of Counsel for ChildrenNACC National Association of Career CollegesNAcc Nucleus Accumbens (brain region)) was established in1991 to provide a link between the NATO countries and the members of theformer Warsaw Treaty Organization Warsaw Treaty Organizationor Warsaw Pact,alliance set up under a mutual defense treaty signed in Warsaw, Poland, in 1955 by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. . The NACC had a special role inhelping to manage the allocation of conventional force reductions amongthe states of the former Soviet Union. It has become a forum for theexchange of information among the NATO and former Warsaw Pact Warsaw Pactor Warsaw Treaty OrganizationMilitary alliance of the Soviet Union, Albania (until 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, formed in 1955 in response to West Germany's entry into NATO. countrieson many types of security issues, including peacekeeping. It does notnow include the neutral and/or non-aligned nations of Europe, but Franceexcepted, there would be little objection in doing so, in which case themembership would be essentially the same as the CSCE. The question of whether the NACC can do a better or significantlydifferent job in the area of collective security than the CSCE naturallyarises. If the CSCE continues to be barred from many types of collectivesecurity operations, the NACC may by default assume that responsibility.As a bridge between the nations of East Central Europe and NATO, NACCmight be better positioned than the CSCE to be the main consultationforum for collective security operations. NACC could also accept some ofthe observation and investigation missions currently assigned to theCSCE. In this case, the CSCE could be entrusted with establishing andmonitoring norms for human rights and treatment of minorities, andlong-term conflict resolution assistance, while NATO and NACC, armedwith mandates, would perform the time-urgent fire brigade role. Western European Union The WEU was formed in 1954 as a device to facilitate rearming WestGermany West Germany:see Germany. and bringing it into NATO, and placed limitations on Germanrearmament re��arm?v. re��armed, re��arm��ing, re��armsv.tr.1. To arm again.2. To equip with better weapons.v.intr.To arm oneself again. . Once formed, the WEU transferred all of its responsibilitiesfor defense planning to NATO and remained essentially moribund for 30years. In recent years, members of the E.C. have sought to reshape theWEU as an instrument for the Community's collective defensearrangement. The WEU has entered the peacekeeping and peace-enforcement field bydispatching a fleet to the Adriatic to participate in the U.N.-mandatedblockade against the former Yugoslavia. The decision was madeunanimously by the defense ministers of the WEU, who met in Rome on 20November 1992.(28) One of the main questions confronting the E.C. is whether theprocess of unifying its members will continue with the intensity andrapidity envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty Maastricht Treatyofficially Treaty on European UnionAgreement that established the European Union (EU) as successor to the European Community. It bestowed EU citizenship on every national of its member states, provided for the introduction of a central . The Danish rejection ofMaastricht, the British withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism andthe narrow approval of Maastricht in the French referendum suggest thatthe momentum toward deepening economic, political and militarycooperation has dissipated somewhat, perhaps considerably. This may meanin turn that the WEU will not develop as rapidly as some of itssupporters would hope. In this case, the main contribution of the E.C.to collective security would be to increase its efforts to stabilize theeconomies of East Central Europe and the newly independent states New��ly Independent States? Abbr. NISThe countries that until 1991 were constituent republics of the USSR, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. of theformer Soviet Union. Commonwealth of Independent States Several of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Unionagreed to a collective security arrangement on 15 May 1992 in aconference held in Tashkent. The signatory countries included Russia,Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Sincethen, this role of the CIS was recognized by the Helsinki Document of1992, and also by President Bush in his speech to the United Nations on21 September 1992. Progress has been very slow in converting intentionsinto reality. Marshall Evgenii Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the CIS jointArmed Forces, was quoted in Izvestiya on 17 November 1992 as citingproblems internal to the CIS as the main military threat to thatfederation. He included conflicts, territorial disputes between newlysovereign states, the uncertain status of Russian forces outside Russiaand unconstitutional troop formations in his list of concerns. CISpeacekeeping forces, he said, would include units specifically allocatedby each member-state that would come under the CIS joint command intimes of need. In the meantime, however, former Soviet military contingents stillbased in the newly independent states have engaged in so-calledpeacekeeping activities, sometimes with a mandate, at times without.These experiences suggest that peace-enforcement operations may beperformed by Russian troops in the smaller, newly independent republicswithout much reference to international organizations. The appeals ofvarious politicians and leaders in the new states for intervention haveproduced no results. The CSCE has dispatched observer missions, but noother actions have been taken by the CSCE, aside from protesting thecontinued stationing of Russian forces in the Baltic states. As of theend of 1992, CIS peacekeeping forces appear not to exist except in theform of Russian units. The Consequences of a Failure to Practice Collective Security The Yugoslav crisis through the end of 1992 demonstrated that thegovernments one would expect to lead a collective approach were notwilling to pay the price that a commitment to collective securitydemanded: Major nation-states concluded that the benefits of enforcinginternational norms were not equal to the costs of doing so. Themilitary efforts required were thought to be in the range of 100,000 ormore troops. Cooperation in the interest of dealing with the problems ofthe former Yugoslavia also failed to emerge because of fears of unequalsacrifices among the potential cooperating nations. All of this,combined with the expectation that the war could be confined to theterritory of the former Yugoslavia, resulted in a cost-benefit analysisthat through the end of 1992 consistently produced decisions that failedto match the escalating needs for a collective response. The valueassigned by governments to collective security was not weighty enough toovercome claims of national self-interest. Collective security requires that governments perceive that aflouting of broadly accepted international norms, particularly thoserelated to the use of force, is a direct threat to their nationalinterests even though their own interests may not be immediatelyaffected. Collective security does not require that states automaticallyrespond with the correct mix of diplomacy and force to each and everyviolation of the norms of the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act ofthe CSCE. Mistakes and errors of judgment cannot be excluded even ifstates are committed to acting in accordance with the notion ofcollective security. Cost-benefit analyses must be conducted by statescommitted to collective security. No government can be excused from theresponsibility of assessing the costs to itself of embarking on acollective response to even the most flagrant violation of internationalnorms. The situation in the former Soviet Union may also provide insightsinto the consequences of a failure to take collective action seriously.Former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger has flatly charged that"Russian leaders try - at least tacitly - to keep open the optionof repeating the events of 1917-1922, when many of the current group ofindependent republics attempted to break away only to be forced in theend to return to Moscow's fold." He argued, furthermore, that"it is so-called ethnic conflicts that will be the most likelypretexts of recentralization."(29) Triggering these harsh judgments was "A Charter forAmerican-Russian Partnership and Friendship," issued by PresidentsBush and Yeltsin on 17 June 1992.(30) Kissinger's attack wasfocused especially on the clauses that advocated the creation of a credible Euro-Atlantic peacekeeping capability,based on CSCE political authority, which allows for the use of thecapacities of NACC, NATO, and WEU to prepare, support, and manageoperations for [the] CSCE as well as allows for the contribution offorces and resources from any and all CSCE states. The document also noted "the potential of other institutionsand mechanisms, including the CIS, in support of security and peace inthe area...." The Charter reflected ideas about a Euro-Atlantic community thathad been discussed by Bush administration spokespersons since U.S.secretary of state James Baker's Berlin speech of 12 December 1989.As a statement of aspirations for a Russian-U.S. future in which aworking partnership is the objective of policy, there is nothing in itthat warrants criticism. It is difficult to avoid the impression,however, that while this rhetoric was designed to be supportive ofdemocratic Russia, it was not intended to be a blueprint for action. The contemporary scene in the CIS may not be so ominous asKissinger paints it. Recentralizing the former Soviet empire is probablynot what the Russians intend, and in any case, they are probablyincapable of such a reunion. George Kennan's view of Russianthinking is probably more accurate, as indicated by the following quotefrom 16 December 1944: ... as far as border states Border StatesThe slave states of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri that were adjacent to the free states of the North during the Civil War. are concerned the Soviet government hasnever ceased to think in terms of spheres of interest....Our people...have been allowed to hope that the Soviet government would beprepared to enter into an international security organization with trulyuniversal power to prevent aggression. We are now faced with theprospect of having our people disabused of this illusion.(31) The problem is much the same today. No amount of criticism ofRussian behavior toward what they call the "near abroad" willcorrect anything. It is important not to mislead the public about thealternatives to collective security. If the Western countries, actingthrough the United Nations or the CSCE, are prepared to insist thatcollective security operations should be mounted where necessary informer Soviet republics and are prepared to invest the energy andresources to make this happen, there will exist a viable alternative toRussian intervention. Otherwise, none exists. Unilateral intervention will be the inevitable result of a failureof the international community to create collective security mechanismsand enforce their utilization. If the United Nations and the CSCE arenot responsive to the conflicts in the former Soviet Union, Russiaprobably will step in to quell the disorder. Very few major powers arecomfortable with violent conflict on their frontiers, especially iftheir own internal stability is threatened by the violence. It ispossible that eventually the same sort of situation could arise in EastCentral Europe. In the absence of a collective response, one or anotherof the major powers of Western or Central Europe is likely to intervenein the interest of stability in its immediate proximity. Spheres ofinterest will develop from the strategies and actions of what will soonbecome regional hegemons. Perhaps regional policemen are a more realistic solution to theproblem of creating international order than a broad collective securityapproach would be. If so, politicians should prepare their publics forsuch an outcome, for disillusionment DisillusionmentAdams, Nickloses innocence through WWI experience. [Am. Lit.: “The Killers”]Angry Young Mendisillusioned postwar writers of Britain, such as Osborne and Amis. [Br. Lit. over the failure of collectivesecurity and anger over the behavior of regional hegemons could create acombustible com��bus��ti��bleadj.Capable of igniting and burning.n.A substance that ignites and burns readily. international atmosphere. The dangers are also evident if one contemplates the Europeanexperience with spheres of interest. Typically, this has encouragedcompetition for power in precisely the manner that realist politicaltheorists contend nation-states normally behave. The task of restoringorder, if undertaken by a few great powers, can degenerate rapidly to apolicy of aggrandizement ag��gran��dize?tr.v. ag��gran��dized, ag��gran��diz��ing, ag��gran��diz��es1. To increase the scope of; extend.2. To make greater in power, influence, stature, or reputation.3. and of apportioning European real estate tosuit the interests of the major powers. The next step is war.(1.) The views expressed in this essay are those of the author alone.They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Instituteof Peace The United States Institute of Peace or USIP was established in 1986 by the United States Congress to study the "prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts" [1]. . This is an amended version of a chapter to be published inPhil Williams Professor Philip James Stradling Williams (January 11, 1939 – June 10,2003) was a Welsh politician for Plaid Cymru and scientist. BackgroundWilliams was born in Tredegar in the industrial valleys of south Wales and grew up in Bargoed, another industrial town. and James Goodby, NATO Crisis Management (London:Brassey's, 1993). Forthcoming. (2.) Winston Churchill, TheGathering Storm (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947) p. 18. (3.) Seefor example, Henry Kissinger, "Germany, Neutrality and the|Security System' Trap," Washington Posts, 15 April 1990. p.D7 and "What Kind of New World Order?" Washington Post, 3December 1991. A thoughtful analysis is provided in Josef Joffe,"Collective Security and the Future of Europe," Survival(Spring 1992) pp. 36-50. (4.) John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict,Adelphi Paper, 270 (Summer 1992) p. 26. (5.) Claude Sudetic,"Yugoslav Factions Agree to U.N. Plan to Halt Civil War," NewYork New York, state, United StatesNew York,Middle Atlantic state of the United States. It is bordered by Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the Atlantic Ocean (E), New Jersey and Pennsylvania (S), Lakes Erie and Ontario and the Canadian province of Times, 3 January 1992; see also Trevor Rowe, "U.N. DelaysYugoslav Peace Force," Washington Post, 6 February 1992, p. A24. Ittook another month of hard negotiating to hammer out an agreement toplace a U.N. force in Croatia. The U.N. Security Council approved a planon 21 February to deploy 14,000 peacekeepers to See John Burns,"First U.N. Officers Arrive in Yugoslavia," New York Times, 9March 1992, p. A7. (6.) Images from Serb detention camps led to renewedtalk of intervention. See Craig R. Whitney, Balkan Scenes Stir Europe,But Action Remains Elusive," New York Times, August 1992, p. A1 andMichael R. Gordon Michael R. Gordon is the chief military correspondent for The New York Times [1]. Together with Judith Miller, he wrote most of that paper's coverage of the Bush administration's case for war with Iraq in 2002. , "NATO Seeks Options to Troop Plan inBosnia," New York Times, 14 August 1992, P. A6. In spring and earlysummer 1992, the European powers also considered intervention. See CraigR. Whitney, Unity on Balkans Eludes Europeans," New York Times, 25April 1902, p. 3 and Alan Riding, "Europe, Weary and Burned, IsLimiting Its Risk in Bosnia," New York Times, 17 May 1992, p.10.(7.) Frank J. Prial Frank J. Prial, who graduated from Georgetown University in 1951, was the wine columnist for the New York Times for 25 years. His writing was intended to illuminate rather than obfuscate with that “peculiar subgenre of the English language” that he calls , "U.N. Council Acts on Bosnia Airport,"New York Times, 9 June 1992, p. All and Paul Lewis, "U.N. Votes toSend Troops to Reopen Sarajevo Airport," New York Times, 30 June1992, p. A10. (8.) Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1953) p. 142. (9.) ibid., p. 332; Joffe, p. 37. (10.)E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years TWENTY YEARS. The lapse of twenty years raises a presumption of certain facts, and after such a time, the party against whom the presumption has been raised, will be required to prove a negative to establish his rights. 2. Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper RowPublishers, 1964) p. 10. (11.) ibid, pp. 208-9. (12.) Joffe, p. 42.(13.) The literature on this point includes Robert Axelrod, TheEvolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) and RobertKeohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World PoliticalEconomy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). (14.) StephenD. Krasner Stephen Krasner (born 1942) is an international relations professor at Stanford University and is the former Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State, a position he held from 2005 until April 2007 while on leave from Stanford. , "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes asIntervening Variables," in Krasner, ed., International Regimes(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) p. 1. (15.) Keohane, p.246. (16.) Morgenthau, p. 335. Morgenthau, however, thought thatcollective security would probably make any war anywhere in the worldpotentially a world war. (17.) For an elaboration of my argument on thispoint, see "Commonwealth and Concert: Organizing Principles ofPost-Containment Order in Europe," The Washington Quarterly (Summer1991) pp. 71-90. (18.) CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, IV, paragraph 2.(19.) An example is the following quote, "Peace-keeping operations,some of which drag on for decades, have become a source of soaring costswith minimal oversight." See William Branigan, "As U.N.Expands, So Do Its Problems," Washington Post, 20 September 1992,p. A1. (20.) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace(New York: UnitedNations, 1992) p. 44. (21.) See "CSCE Missions," a summaryprepared by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation inEurope Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), also known as the Helsinki Commission, is an independent U.S. Government agency. It was established in 1976 pursuant to Public Law No. 94-304. of the U.S. Congress, September 1992. (22.) This description isdrawn from the CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, III, paragraphs 22, 23, 52and 54. (23.) On the blockade, see Frank J. Prial, "U.N.Strengthens Curbs on Belgrade by Authorizing a Naval Blockade," NewYork Times, 17 November 1992, p. A1. (24.) CSCE Helsinki Document 1992,III, paragraph 17. (25.) Professor James H. Laue of George MasonUniversity's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution hassuggested that "true and full resolution of conflict occurs onlythrough negotiation or some other form of joint problem-solvinginvolving the parties to the conflict - not in any lasting or ultimateform, through military action, control, coercion, |blue ribbon'panels, or expert advice." Quoted in the U.S. Institute of PeaceJournal, V, no. 5 (October 1992) p. 4. (26.) See Eric Schmitt, "ANaval Blockade of Belgrade Seen Within a Few Days," New York Times,18 November 1992, p. A1 and William Drozdiak, "NATO Agrees toImpose Blockade of Serbia," Washington Post, 19 November 1992, p.A31. (27.) On the earlier sanction, see Paul Lewis, "U.N. VotesTrade Sanctions Against Yugoslavia, 13 to 0; Air Travel and OilCurbed," New York Times, 31 May 1992, p. A1. (28.) Alan Cowell,"NATO and European Warships Blockade Yugoslavia," New YorkTimes, 21 November 1992, p. A3. (29.) Henry Kissinger, "Charter ofConfusion," Washington Post, 5 July 1992, p. C7. (30.) U.S. ArmsControl and Disarmament One of the major efforts to preserve international peace and security in the twenty-first century has been to control or limit the number of weapons and the ways in which weapons can be used. Two different means to achieve this goal have been disarmament and arms control. Agency, "Arms Control-Related Material fromthe Summit Meeting Between U.S. President Bush and Russian FederationPresident Yeltsin," Washington, DC, 16-17 June 1992. (31.) GeorgeF. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: little, Brown and Company, 1967)p. 222.